

# FAITH AND FREEDOM

A JOURNAL OF  
PROGRESSIVE RELIGION



30265

Volume 7  
Part I

AUTUMN  
1953

Number  
Nineteen

# FAITH AND FREEDOM

A JOURNAL OF PROGRESSIVE RELIGION

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LAUNCHED AT THE INSTANCE OF THE OLD  
STUDENTS' ASSOCIATION OF MANCHESTER  
COLLEGE, OXFORD, WITH THE FINANCIAL  
SUPPORT OF THE DR. DANIEL JONES TRUST  
PUBLISHED AT  
MANCHESTER COLLEGE, OXFORD, ENGLAND

Editorial and Subscriptions at 23 Cheltenham Avenue, Liverpool, 17  
ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTION 5/-, Single Copies 2/- post free.  
U.S.A. and Dollar Area Annual Subscription \$1.00 post free, to  
ROBERT RAIBLE, 4015, Normandy, Dallas, 5. Texas, U.S.A



## *Speaking with Authority, yet Free*

F. J. HAMBLIN

**S**UPPOSE I, as a minister, were to claim that on a certain day the Lord spoke to me, telling me to stand up before the people and preach, promising that the word which I spoke should not be my word but his word; those who heard my claim would have grave doubt concerning my sanity.

My conviction that my teaching contains, in any measure, the truth of God, is subject to all the familiar qualifications. Our teaching can be analysed into sound knowledge or misinformation, belief, opinion or, maybe, prejudice; it can be examined in the light of various 'ologies;' any one of our utterances can be seen as the product of a certain psycho-physical organism, the respective contributions of heredity, personal history, environment, temperament, character and disposition. Such influences mainly determine both what we say and how we say it. Yet, when all the analysing has been done and all the admissions of fallibility made, there yet remains something that we cannot isolate and identify which is, nevertheless, there—some modicum of absolute truth which does not depend on our personally acquired beliefs and opinions, is not an actual product of the organism we call ourself but is that portion of the truth of God with which we are charged. This truth sometimes exercises a compelling force, making us treat of certain matters, follow certain lines of speech or action, which we are unwilling to do and would not do but for the inward urge that tells us we must. But as in any specific item of our teaching, so in any case of inward compulsion, we are shy of claiming direct divine guidance; and rightly so, for our experience is that when men are most certain of this they are often most wildly mistaken and liable to fall into fanaticism. Yet the conviction remains that there is some measure of a truth, some intermittent experience of a compulsion, neither of them originating within ourselves; and it is this conviction which, if itself valid, gives validity to the ministry.

Some such conviction belongs to the individual experience of most ministers. It is implicit in the very notion of a "call to the ministry." The question now arises: Are there so many separate convictions, fortuitously similar, which ministers happen to possess as individuals, or do we, in fact, share one conviction of the divine truth and power operating through ourselves as inadequate and faulty vehicles? If the latter is true, it would appear that the conviction would be strengthened, the truth and power to which it relates purified and invigorated, in a society of those who share it.

Or, to put it in another form, can a religious community, of a kind that does not claim to be or possess an authority, yet operate socially in such a way that its ministers and members are

strengthened in their individual sense of authority, and gain more-over a true sense of common authority?

When an orthodox controversialist clinches an argument to his own satisfaction by citing his "authority," the liberal feels himself at a disadvantage, being able to produce nothing which his opponent would recognise as "an authority." This situation arises in various forms both on the Continent, where it presents a pressing problem, and in this country, where we are apt to assume that we can rely only upon personal judgment and individual conviction of right. We know of no authority higher than our mental convictions, maturely considered and conscientiously held.

In one sense, this is beyond dispute. Everybody, I suppose, accepts as final the conviction of his own mind, even if it is the conviction that such-and-such an "authority" is absolute and that its *dicta* must be accepted. Yet it by no means follows that each man should be a "law unto himself" or that personal reliance upon individual conviction must necessarily be socially chaotic. We find considerable agreement among ourselves; our differences are not divisive. But an Anglican clergyman within my knowledge, when ill, found himself unable to seek the help for a funeral service of his nearest Anglican neighbour, who happened to belong to a different "school." Such a situation could not arise among us. We would gladly accept the help of anyone in our ministry and even some willing minister of another communion. With all our freedom to differ as much as we please, we are far more harmonious in practice than some who are held in straiter bonds of uniformity. It might be better if we gave more prominence to this characteristic, both in our presentation of ourselves to others and in our own minds.

Perhaps the difficulty of the modern liberal in face of the orthodox is one that was familiar to Jesus himself. "Neither tell I you by what authority I do these things," seems to be an indication that he who is said to have taught as one having authority may not have found it easy to appeal to "an authority" recognisable as such by those accustomed to rabbinical methods.

The difference between "authority" and "an authority" is radical and complete. The authority which Jesus had was plainly different in kind and not merely in content from the "rule of the elders." It is not easy to avoid mental confusion when the same word is used for different, though related, things. Our rejection of "authorities" has led us to neglect unduly, the idea of authority. It may be because of this that members of our movement show so little of the sense of compulsion, have so little feeling of being committed to anything in particular—defects which betray themselves in the weakness of our churchmanship and the general disregard of our message. Among a population where so many fragments of our thought appear to be floating piecemeal one might expect a ready response to whomsoever could gather them together. Perhaps we have not sufficiently gathered them together ourselves;



and in particular not adequately related our conceptions of freedom and authority.

From the Oxford Conference of the I.A.R.F. came a call "to lead our generation to an analysis of the ideas of freedom and authority." The purpose of such an analysis is, I take it, to discover whether some synthesis is possible, and whether our freedom necessarily debars us from functioning as a coherent movement and presenting a coherent message to our fellows. Does it not give us the right to speak a message which, while not rigidly fixed, is yet authoritative?

I shall not attempt a definition of freedom. It has many aspects and that which concerns us seems to be covered by what Whitehead calls Adventure, "the search for new perfection." This seems to me quite sufficient for our purpose. Characteristic of Christianity in all its forms is an attempt to reach the perfect life. That perfection is variously conceived, from a Heaven of eternal harp-playing to a spiritual harmony with God. The means of reaching it range, according to denomination, from taking the right sacraments to living as well and thinking as truly as possible. The goal may be conceived as a reward in the hereafter or a quality of life that can be partially realised now.

In so far as the nature of the perfection is deemed to be known and the means of attaining it laid down by rule, the word *search* becomes inapplicable. The practice of an orthodoxy is, to the orthodox, the known route to the goal; in a strict orthodoxy it is the only route. The liberalisation of an orthodoxy permits more variation, a possibility of alternative routes, a new interpretation of traditional descriptions of the goal, while still assuming that the essentials are included within the ancient formulae; it permits search within a limited area for a new conception of the old ideal of perfection. "But," as Whitehead says, "such variations are easily exhausted. Bolder adventure is needed—the adventure of ideas, and the advantage of practice conforming itself to ideas. The best service that ideas can render is gradually to lift into the mental poles the ideal of another type of perfection which becomes a programme for reform. An illustration of this is the service of Christianity by its introduction of new ideals for the social life of mankind. In other words, the ideal of a new society derived from a new defining characteristic is introduced."

Most of us would probably admit that we are at a somewhat confused stage of adventure. We have our programme for reform whereby individually, socially or politically we seek to realise the ideals we have already conceived, ideals in which we still recognise an element of imperfection. So, while we labour for the good we know, we continue intermittently and uncertainly to grope after a higher ideal, which we assume in faith will be found in the same direction but beyond. In the reform stage our liberty must be restricted by the measures deemed necessary to achieve our limited

aim; we may accept direction from the framers of a policy. In the further stage, the quest for a new ideal, no restriction of that kind is known. We cannot admit an external authority to tell us where we shall look; for we do not agree that such an authority can even know for what it is that we are seeking.

There is, however, one obvious limitation on the 'go-as-you-pleaseness' of freedom in the quest for the divine perfection—and that limitation proceeds from the nature of the perfection itself. Every true experience of God that I have, or that is communicated to me through others, is a forward step that I can only retract at the cost of finding myself further from my goal. Conversely, every mistaken assumption of true experience is either a stumbling block to be removed or a wayward step to be corrected.

For a working description of authority I take a paragraph from the preface of Martineau's *Seat of Authority*, where he says, "I am prepared to hear that after dispensing with miracles and infallible persons, I have no right to speak of 'authority' at all, the intuitionist assurance which I substitute for it being nothing but confidence in my own reason. If to rest on authority is to mean an acceptance of what, as foreign to my faculty, I cannot know, in mere reliance on the testimony of one who can and does, I certainly find no such basis for religion; inasmuch as second-hand belief, assented to at the dictation of an initiated expert, without personal response of thought and reverence in myself, has no more tincture of religion in it than any other lesson learned by rote. The mere resort to testimony for information beyond our province does not fill the meaning of 'authority,' which we never acknowledge till that which speaks to us from another and higher strikes home and awakes the echoes in ourselves, and is thereby instantly transferred from external attestation to self-evidence. And this response it is which makes the moral intuitions, started by outward appeal, reflected back by inward veneration, more than egoistic phenomena, and turning into correspondency between the universal and the individual mind, invests them with true 'authority.' We trust in them, not with any rationalist arrogance because they are our own, but precisely because they are *not* our own, with awe and aspiration. The *consciousness* of authority is doubtless human, but conditional on the *source* being divine."

As I understand this, Martineau's correspondency between the individual and the universal mind is not to be taken as a mere assimilation but a dynamic process of interaction between the divine appeal and the human response. Martineau's psychology is akin to that of the modern hormic school.<sup>1</sup> His inward "assurance" seems to play a part similar to that of an emotion in McDougall's psychology and his "moral intuitions," which must necessarily be more enduring and organised than the feeling of assurance, cannot

<sup>1</sup> The School that puts Will or striving as the basic faculty of mind, rather than Intellect or Emotion.



be altogether unlike one of McDougall's "sentiments."<sup>1</sup> In any case they must be no less human and individual than the *consciousness* of authority. Such authority as we can have is thus *our* response to the divine stimulus. We cannot allow an external authority to dictate our response, for then we should be responding not to the divine call but to another human voice. The appeal may be the voice of the indwelling God; we may yet mishear it, misinterpret what we have heard or, for some other cause, respond wrongly. The authority which we can *have*, on such a conception of it, will be quite real, yet a long way from infallibility.

If our true freedom to adventure in search of the perfect life is guided by the goal we aim to reach, which is of God; if our true authority is a right response to the appealing voice which, again, is of God, then it seems that the ideas of freedom and authority may be complementary rather than antagonistic. Nor do I find any reason why a free man should not speak and act with authority in the presence of others just as free and possessed of the same authority as himself. I would suggest that this social mingling of freedom with authority could well both increase the freedom and reinforce the authority of every person in the companionship. I would further suggest that although Christians of the first century thought and spoke much more easily than we of specific actions of God, yet we may be here very close in essentials to the original doctrine of inspiration by Holy Spirit.

Taking the stories of events in Jerusalem as no more than fragments of early church gossip, much improved by frequent repetition before they reached the compiler of Acts, there still remain indications of genuine experience. One of the most significant features of the Pentecost story is that "they were all with one accord in one place" when the Spirit "came down on each one of them." Or, we might say, they were in company when each reached his individual consciousness of authority.

The earthquake doublet of the Pentecost story, the filling with Holy Spirit of devout persons and Gentiles at Caesarea and the Pisidian Antioch, whatever their historical value as records of events, stand as testimony of a general experience that a new and striking manifestation of the Spirit was to persons assembled in company, but the actual spiritual guidance operated individually and perhaps even most particularly upon solitary adventurers, who were sometimes led into behaviour for which there was no known precedent. The theme of *Acts* is not so much the story of a Church that was made an authority, as that of a companionship of people each of whom had authority. Yet the assurance of these individually inspired persons was of such a kind that knotty questions had to be resolved at church meetings. We see here an interaction between the individual

<sup>1</sup> Compare Martineau's refutation of Mill's psychological hedonism with that of McDougall. *The Seat of Authority in Religion* (5th Edn.) pp. 64-65; *An Introduction to Social Psychology* (1926) pp. 8, 133, 313-5.

and the social. The single man was doubtless made to feel more powerful by knowing that he had the consensus of the brethren at his back. At the same time the reference of problems to church meetings, where prominent persons doubtless had the most voice, probably began the process whereby the Church constituted itself "an authority" and its prelates, in practice, "the authorities."

It is in fact difficult to maintain in practice the distinction between authority and *an* authority. It is not always easy to keep it clear in one's own mind that one can have authority without setting oneself up as an authority. It is for this reason that we are apt to let the idea of authority slip away from us and be content to regard our work as authoritative only in so far as it can be justified by the accuracy of our knowledge, the soundness of our reasoning and the validity of our training and experience, as individual ministers.

I submit that there is a certain mental and spiritual laziness in this. Granted the primary need for the highest personal integrity in all we say and do and think as individual ministers, there is still, as well as this, and not instead of it, the need to see ourselves and act, as members of a ministry. I, for one, tend to think of myself as a Unitarian minister rather than a member of a Unitarian ministry; and this is surely our prevailing attitude towards ourselves. Here we have, I think, a grave source of weakness, and because I am looking for a source of strength that shall not impair my personal freedom and responsibility, I find help in the conception of authority as a response to a divine impulse proceeding from beyond myself. This is something that I can share with others who are responding, perhaps differently, to the same divine impulse.

I would put it in this way. Taking all behaviour, whether physical or mental, as our response to stimuli that come from our environment, psychologists can describe to us the situations that lead us to seek certain ends; they can describe the emotion that accompanies the perception of the situation and the taking of action to deal with it; they can describe the processes whereby more complex and even indirect modes of action replace the primitive means of reaching the end, and the substitution of ends other than those of the primitive impulse. It is particularly in the improvement of the means towards an end and in the substitution of higher for lower objectives that education plays its part—and by education here I mean not formal schooling nor conscious self-teaching alone, but all that we gain socially. Intercourse with our fellows makes each of us a civilised human being instead of the ignorant savages we would otherwise be. The stimuli from our environment reach each of us individually; but because they come from the same environment we learn and organise our responses socially. Not as mere units in society but as individuals we gain; we become responsible persons—and it is fairly safe to say that the person least likely to be swept away by mere social pressure and mass



movements of thought and feeling is precisely he who has best learned to see himself and behave as a responsible member of society rather than a self-conscious individualist.

One assumption of psychology is that the situations in which we find ourselves are real, that the stimuli reach us from an environment which actually is outside ourselves, though there may be errors in our perception and interpretation of it. Our assumption as ministers of religion is that the Spirit outside ourselves is real, with the same liabilities of error in perception and interpretation. If we accept the possibility that actual stimuli from a spiritual environment can reach us (and if we do not accept that possibility I do not see how we can pray for spiritual good and guidance), then is there any reason why we should not socially correct, enrich and organise our spiritual response? Can we expect that our individual freedom will be enriched and enlarged and our separate responsibility increased by our learning to regard ourselves as members of a ministry rather than as individual ministers? Finally can we conclude that nobody is safer against the fetters of *an* authority than those who *share* the consciousness of having authority?

I end on a note of question, not as a rhetorical device for stating my own opinions. Indeed I have probably seemed to make assertions when my own mental state would have been more correctly expressed by "I wonder whether . . ." or "It seems possible that . . ." I question because, like Rosa Dartle, I want to know. Some light on my questions might be thrown by a proper appreciation of "passive sympathy," the tendency of individuals in a company to act and feel alike. This has a bad reputation from its association with "mob psychology" where it accentuates the baser impulses of the persons in the crowd. Perhaps we are too ready to assume that it operates only on the lower instincts. It surely contributes to "the atmosphere of worship." It seems possible that, properly cultivated, in a society whose members were determined not to elevate their herd-sentiment into "an authority," might it not prove to be a mighty dynamic, even as it was in the experience of the first Christians?

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# *Religious Absolutes and Moral Impotence*

WINSTON L. KING, PH.D.

THE Christian faith rests upon an apprehension of ultimate reality and moral absolutes which in combination are called God. But when this faith, obsessed by its absolutes and ultimates, lacks those "middle axioms" by which it may articulate its sense of God to the contemporary scene, its gospel becomes irrelevant and its interpretation of divine values may issue in moral inadequacy or even paralysis.

There are at least three contemporary interpretations of Christianity in which this seems to have occurred. One fastens attention almost exclusively upon a future state of the soul or an imminent supra-historical event by which divine righteousness shall impose its final will upon history; the second so intensifies the sense of the strange otherness of God from all that is human that it creates a well-nigh impassable gulf between God and man; and the third takes one moral dimension of the Christian gospel and so absolutizes it that it becomes un-actionable in any practical manner.

The first-named interpretation of Christianity is that which makes of a climactic divine interposition in human history, or a future state of the soul, or both, its ultimate and absolute dimension. All its attention is focussed upon a specific individual relation to God or upon a sharply specified divine act. Adventism is the most sharply defined expression of this attitude, though secondarily we may include any religious interpretation which is predominantly other-worldly. The eternal world, whether viewed as a sort of static omni-present layer of reality or as a swiftly approaching day of judgment and glory, is made into both an historical ultimate and a moral absolute from which there is no relief or appeal. Everything in the religious life must be motivated by this prospect and all human activity valued or disvalued with sole reference to it.

To be sure, any authentic interpretation of the Christian faith will confront the world with other-worldly values and judgments. There is truth in Niebuhr's insistence that history must be evaluated and historical action motivated by a standard of reference which lies outside history. God, made in the image of man, and heaven, made in the image of earth, are neither God nor heaven. But the point here is that in these predominantly other-worldly interpretations of religion, the particular feature of the divine-human relationship chosen for supreme emphasis creates a moral and social impasse. The heavenly life, the individual soul's salvation, and the millennial world are so radically discontinuous with the contemporary social and political order, or indeed any mundane



order whatever, that the world order cannot in any observable way be fitted meaningfully into the framework of the heavenly. The essential business of living is preparation of the individual soul for its eternal destiny and it is only at great peril to this destiny that a man may concern himself with anything not directly and manifestly connected with that business. Except for the deep, narrow groove of action thus allowed there is no other important or relevant activity; except for that very narrow bridge over the abyss between the two worlds, there is no connection at all between them. Indeed, the millennial or heavenly world is a sort of fourth dimension whose only relation to present life is its radical difference therefrom.

It should be, but is not always, obvious that such an interpretation brings next to no guidance to contemporary life. According to the adventist view, for example, the condition of the present world is appalling. But almost equally appalling is the spirit produced by this viewpoint. For it is one of almost total alienation of heart from contemporary life and society. Those who espouse it have no essential interest in joining themselves integrally to any important aspect of that life, unless they are happily inconsistent, because to them that life is basically futile and possibly sinful. It is lived in a world which has little but a negative connection with the world to come. And it is hardly worth one's while to attempt to discriminate seriously between matters of third and fourth-rate importance in an evanescent and evil world-order. One should concern himself as little as possible with its affairs, waiting in watchful readiness for the world which is to be.

Strangely enough this negative and defeatist attitude is often joined with virulent brands of social and political conservatism and a slavish obedience to governmental control. But perhaps it is not so strange after all. For those who think that this world is not worth any real effort will readily leave it to those who do; and he whose main duty is to wait for the milliennial revolution or the heavenly life has only a minimal interest in contemporary revolutions.

The second absolutism, that of an overwhelming sense of the non-human otherness of God, has been most emphatically stressed in recent times by Kirkegaard and Barth. Rather than with an eternal world just over death's threshold, or the imminent return of Christ, they concern themselves with a transcendent God. He is awe-full majesty, the eternally Other. Absolute and ultimate, he stands yonder athwart our human life. Unapproachable through any human effort, inapprehensible by any metaphysical insight or moral intuition, his only word to us is: "For my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways."

The companion-piece to this aggressive reassertion of the ancient majesty and splendour of the name of God, as against an all-too-humanly conceived deity, has been a renewed emphasis

upon human sinfulness. As the stature of God has been increased, that of man has been diminished, both metaphysically and morally; man is utterly other than God, both in his being and in his moral-spiritual nature. Part of his moral otherness inheres in his finitude; as finite and creaturely he cannot be God-like. But, more important, there is a strong emphasis upon the moral failure of man even within the limits of his finitude, upon his un-likeness to God's holiness at every conceivable point, and upon the utter inability of his sin-riddled moral will to achieve divine sonship. In a word, Barthianism presents a strenuous call to repentance and seeks to destroy completely man's self-sufficient and self-assured moral pride.

This reassertion of human sinfulness has called forth a widely diversified and sympathetic response. Once again, even in the strains of Christian thought far removed from crisis theology we hear the echoes of that well-nigh forgotten word from the scriptures: "For *all* have sinned and come short of the glory of God." Disillusioned modern religious progressivism has made haste, in some quarters at least, to face about and proclaim the sinfulness of man with enthusiasm. Particularly with relation to ethical conduct three interrelated assertions have been made: (1) God is to be conceived as pre-eminently a moral judge; (2) his judgments are devastatingly different from ours with regard to degrees of human sinfulness; and (3) in view of our universal involvement in sinfulness no man has the right to cast stones at any other, or enter into moral judgment upon him.

There is that in the Bible which supports this view. It is explicitly stated there that the judgment of God frequently, if not always, varies from that of man. He looks upon the heart, whereas man looks upon outward appearances. The apparently lesser sins are often greater in His sight. Israel's sins, certainly less in quantity and even less gross in quality than the surrounding people's sins, yet called forth Yahweh's burning condemnation.

And how often Jesus, in the name of his Father, reversed the conventional judgments of his day! He forbade man to cast stones till they themselves were sinless. He it was who asserted most tellingly the difference between Kingdom and conventional righteousness: "Verily, I say unto you, the publicans and harlots go into the kingdom of God before you." Those who had lost a sense of social respectability, without national loyalty and offenders against the moral codes of their time, the dissolute and outcaste—these were nearer to God's kingdom of righteousness than the respected moral pillars of religion. Here is a full-scale and complete reversal of our standards by the divine! How dare any man, in view of God's otherness of standard say to his fellow: "My sin is more righteous than your sin. Your sin must be destroyed."

Now there can be no doubt but that a profound realisation of God's otherness or transcendence is, in some sense, present in all vital religious faith. God, as other, is the basic foundation of



religious motivation; as different from men, he is that fulcrum by which they are prised out of the mire of sin. It is because he is other than men that they know the purifying fear of him and are transformed to his likeness, rather than conformed to their environment. Much contemporary liberal religion is weak precisely because it has no sense of sin and knows no God who is worthy of awe or adoration. The God it knows induces no fear or reverence but only happy, we might almost say jolly, good fellowship. God is become a familiar commodity which can be neatly packaged with the strings of human description and readily delivered to almost anyone.

But let us ask further. Is the only alternative to liberalism to conceive the righteousness of God as so completely "other" than our own that it is utterly incomprehensible to us? Can our relation to it be only a blank gaze of misunderstanding and despair? And still further: Does a Christian's humility of spirit, his realisation of God's transcendence and his own sinfulness, reduce him to a perpetual and enervating repentance by which he is rendered incapable of relevant ethical judgments or morally conditioned action? In a word, must a sense of sin mean total moral impotence?

Even though it is neglected by those who magnify the divine transcendence, an equally integral part of the Christian apprehension of God is the impetus it gives to the assertion of moral principle and to ethically conditioned action on the human level. The peculiar quality and glory of the Judeo-Christian religious tradition is that its God-consciousness strengthens and illumines human moral sensibilities rather than blurring or obliterating them. God's moral nature is conceived to be blended in indissoluble unity with his metaphysical being at its deepest level; and the ethical sensibilities of those who are truly apprehended of him are thereby stimulated and intensified. The Hebrew prophets and Jesus, who have spoken to us most convincingly of God, also spoke intensively of his ethical demands upon men. And further, they specified them in singularly concrete terms.

Thus the prophets did not present to Israel some utterly new and different standard of righteousness in the name of Yahweh. The sins which they condemned were common and well-known. The newness of their message was that Israel, God's chosen people, would be judged for *their* sins as the surrounding heathen would be for theirs. There was no room in God's justice for an immoral partiality.

Jesus did not seek to create moral chaos by his apparent reversal of conventional ethical judgments, or to suggest that there were no morally conditioned judgments which men might make upon human conduct. Publicans and sinners were nearer to the Kingdom not because their actions were not sinful—for he said: "Go and sin no more"—but because their sin was of weakness rather than of self-righteousness. They were within reach of penitence. Clearly and specifically Jesus spoke of the nature of God, of the human

attitudes and actions which He condemned or approved, and of the high moral demands which He made upon men. The major accomplishment of the prophets and of Jesus was their moralisation of the relationship between God and men. "For what doth the Lord require of thee, but to do justly, to love mercy and walk humbly with thy God." "The first and great commandment is . . . thou shalt love the Lord thy God . . . And the second is like unto it: Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself."

That transcendent otherness of God of which the Christian faith teaches should not be conceived as the quality of a "wholly Other" but of the "Holy Other," as that of a moral holiness which is greater in degree than human goodness but not different in kind. A faith in such a God will bring to men a quickening realisation of old and neglected moral values, an extension of them to new areas, and an increment of moral courage and resource, rather than ethical confusion. Humbly—because he knows that he too is a sinner—but steadfastly—because he knows that God supremely demands moral righteousness of men. The man of faith earnestly seeks to bring the ethical quality of the Kingdom of Heaven into his earthly life.

The third interpretation of the Christian faith which may result in moral paralysis, or at least ethical inadequacy, is of different kind from the first two. With them the matter is one of insufficient moralisation of religious absolutes. Here it is a matter of the magnification of one moral element in the Christian gospel, to the stature of an engulfing absolute which renders it unable to deal realistically with its contemporary world. I speak of pacifism.

Pacifism describes Christian love as active, harmless benevolence and interprets it as the major dimension of the Christian life; or should one say its absolute dimension? Any actions that do not spring pure and undefiled from such benevolence, consciously motivated, or any actions that acknowledge dependence even in part upon other than ideal drives, are accounted less than Christian or even un-Christian. A Christian, it is said, must act only on the "redemptive level" of reality and not upon its "creative," or physically coercive, level. Only on the purely spiritual level of absolute love can one be a Christian. All that is less than this—partial goods, mixed motives, subordination of unbridled force to law, and the constructive direction of existent force, is accorded only a grudging recognition or is by-passed altogether.

A subtle perversion of this pacifist absolutism appeared prominently in the editorials of an influential American religious periodical during the Second World War. Apparently it presented a would-be pacifist conscience gone to war and attempting to make friends between its peaceable ideals and its war-like actions. Unable to bring the fact of war into any moral purview acceptable to its absolutism, it denied that war was amenable to any ethical judgments at all. War was to be viewed as an impersonal necessity once it had



arrived, on the same plane of natural "act of God" as an earthquake or flood; it was as futile to speak of it in moral terms as an eclipse of the moon, for no significant difference between the hostile powers in degree of responsibility for the war or desirability of their announced war aims was to be found. But since the war was caused by our common sin, and as its actuality represented the judgment of God upon us, therefore let good Christians fight on (presumably with banners waving and 100 per cent. destructive efficiency) as fulfilling the judgment of God which condemns us to fight. Presumably a refusal to fight would be a rebellion against the divine decree. Yet patriots should fight "repentantly," knowing their sin to be the war's cause! Let him who can, make moral or religious sense of this.

The prime difficulty throughout this realm, whether with forthright pacifism or its above-described casuistic perversion, is a covert failure to recognise the factor of physical power existent in the world. It also neglects the adequate consideration of the necessity of making practical ethical distinctions of degrees of purity or clarity, upon which to base human action. It is an attempt to live exclusively in the stratosphere of the ideal world and its perfections without recognising that such an ideal world, like beautiful Venice, has its piles sunk deep in the mud of physical existence and its necessities. If "power without love is horrible," as it is, so equally "love without power is futile."

The truly logical companion of pacifism is adventism, of which we have already spoken. The moral absolutism of the one requires the historical absolutism of the other. By leaving the historical "dirty work" of destroying political and social evil entirely in the hands of God, adventism can concern itself with the purely religious and moral dimensions of life in company with pacifism. Why the two are so seldom joined might merit further inquiry. But it is a major inconsistency of pacifism, while denying the value or necessity of using force in any human relationship whatsoever, to seek to work integrally in a social order maintained in large part by force; or to offer solutions to the problems of that order, while refusing to assume any responsibility for maintaining that order. As a matter of fact, it takes much of the actuality of the force-maintained structure for granted even in its solutions.

No one but the veriest fool, pacifist or not, believes that total war is a total good. No Christian can fail to recognise the common sinfulness present in the aims and methods of the participants in every war, contemporary models included. Nor can anyone discount the frightful wastage of material and human resources, as well as the moral degradation which results. And the Christian church is far less than Christian if it uncritically backs any war effort and if it does not continue to try to implement concretely its vision of world brotherhood.

Nevertheless, this does not mean that a Christian must cease

considering himself to be a Christian unless he can act in the realm of moral perfection on every occasion, with a clear-cut issue between good and evil, God and Satan. Nor can he satisfactorily take the position that a measure of common guilt eliminates all genuine moral motive for action. Even total war is not tantamount to the total obliteration of important ethical distinctions.

If the Christian faith is to be relevant to contemporary crises, the following considerations in the area of the "middle axioms" of which we first spoke, seem pertinent.

(1) *Christian ideals must be so stated as to find a point of major connection with current actualities and be capable of furnishing both a standard of judgment and a constructive critique.* It is not sufficient to declare that the church shall hold aloft a standard of unsullied perfection, say, that of a world of perfect brotherhood, without being able to designate specific roads leading to it from our present unbrotherly society. Nor is it sufficient to thunder loudly the negative judgments of God upon a sinful world and issue a blanket call to repentance. We need ask; repentance from what to what, specifically? The ideal and the judgment taken together must provide a realistic criterion in the light of which the Christian can say: "This method, this institution is better, Christianly speaking, than that one. Take the right fork here, not the left. Support this cause as being more of the Kingdom's embodiment than that other."

This, of course, goes on the assumption of a practical recognition and acceptance of the reality and worth of the present world order. The Christian position would seem to be that this world order is at least worthy of redemption, rather than abandonment, by both man and God. But all of the absolutisms we have surveyed, each in its own way, denies the essential worth of the major results of human accomplishment and effort in this area.

(2) *Christian faith must recognise the necessary (or actual) existence of non-ideal means in this world and be prepared to choose among them without confusing means and ends, or ideals and existences.* Pacifism in particular is guilty of considerable unrealistic thinking and evasion here. Ideals are opposed directly to physical actualities, as though on the same plane with them, and without acknowledgment of the actual physical agencies necessary for the realisation of the ideal. Or sometimes there is such a concentration upon ideal ends or future hopes, that the urgent intermediate steps thereto are not even considered. And unfortunately those who so concentrate seem to assume almost unconsciously a degree of moral superiority, totally unwarranted by the facts, over those who concern themselves with the steps between.

"Passive resistance" has been resoundingly praised in our generation as a "more Christian" means of securing desirable social ends than active resistance. (Whether sabotage would be called passive by the apostles of passive resistance is dubious. It



is surely potentially as violent as any other type of resistance, waiting only for powerful, active support to break into open violence). But it may be questioned whether this high praise is merited even by the non-violent, non-co-operative pattern of social action. It is true that it operates rather directly as a force upon the conscience of the opposition without recourse to physically violent means. But the physical factor, even the threat of physical violence, is not absent. The method has had some apparent success in India because the British conscience was not willing to run street cars or buses over prostrate human bodies. Even here, however, the real efficacy of the resistance, however passive in its use of immediate means, was the covert threat of a social disturbance of paralysing proportions and the threat of its development into a more violent type of mass action. But what would its success be against a philosophy of deliberate cruelty and sadism or, at best, of ruthless opportunism, which avowedly has no regard for the happiness or worth of individual life?

Again we might speak of those who would concentrate their efforts solely on the alleviation of suffering and reconstructive measures in a totally neutral manner and who assume that it is the only fully Christian method of dealing with world crisis. If such people wish to join their efforts with the adventists in their hope of a super-imposed millennium; or if they wish to eschew all active political citizenship, all responsibility for government, and proclaim that the government of this world is a matter of no concern to them . . . let it be done openly. But to attempt to concentrate alone on one small portion of the task of maintaining a stable social order without recognition of the physical basis upon which they must build, is surely an evasion of immoral proportions; or at least an evasion permeated by the quality of moral inadequacy.

Such has seemed to me, after long sympathy and still present admiration for the Quaker witness—its inadequacy when taken as a full-fledged philosophy of Christian life and action. The effort at prevention of war, and the healing of its wounds once it has occurred are not the whole matter. There is the practical necessity for some form of political order, which implies the use of coercion to enforce decisions made in the interests of that order upon the unwilling and unco-operative. Under such circumstances conflicts, both domestic and international, may be unavoidable. And still further: Is the type of order which is established of no interest at all to Christians, a matter of fourth-rate concern? Is a demonstration of good-will a substitute for political organisation and social order? Does not the Christian *as such* have civic and social responsibilities?

(3) *A choice between evils is still a Christian moral choice, if more ideal choices are actually unavailable.* When the absolutes of perfection cannot find avenues of direct expression, then some limited measures, means, or standards that can serve as practical absolutes must be found if action is to ensue. And when and if

the situation is such that both alternatives appear to be evil, or when to make no choice is in effect the implementation of the greater evil, or inaction itself be a third and still greater evil, then the Christian choice is to accept and work for the least of all relevant evils.

The contemporary world situation offers many aspects of such a choice between evils for the Christian. How far shall a Christian go in supporting his nation in an unjust war? Shall he choose to support a small "preventive" war in place of acceding to the drift toward a possible war of global proportions? Which system of oppression and greed, relatively speaking, shall he urge his government to support in opposition to another such system? Which of the great political and social philosophies offered to mankind to-day has in it the least virulent possibility of human exploitation?

These and other like considerations seem to involve the Christian in a fog of relativities and mire him down in a bog of endless compromises, as the absolutist would sense it. And the way of the Christian transgressor against the Absolute is hard indeed, for historic Christianity has majored in absolutes of many sorts. Yet the absolutisms we have surveyed offer no solution either. The first would delay all significant action in a hopelessly evil world till God takes over; the second finds no real possibility of knowing the will of that Absolute Sovereign and Total Stranger, whom some Christians have rather unaccountably called Father; and the third absolutism sounds a full-scale retreat from every major and constructive social responsibility. Difficult as it may be both in practice and theory, the Christian faith calls for a realistic and tough-minded working with the actual means at our disposal toward a Christianly good world. That faith is an insistence that our moral absolutes do have relevance to this world as it now is, and it demands a whole-souled attempt meaningfully to orient them to it. It is a sober but convinced Faith that the Christian is not alone when he seeks to establish the right as he is given to see the right.

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**John William Rattray**, of Aberdeen, is already known to us as the author of "The Wavering Balance" in the Autumn issue, 1952. (Article following).



# *The Hollow Oak*

*A layman's deep remonstrance*

JOHN WM. RATTRAY

DECAY in the power of Orthodox Christianity is nowadays not to be denied. This article gives reason for believing that the causes for this decay are organic to orthodox teaching and dogma. It is submitted that Christianity has suffered grievously from unwarranted emphasis having been placed on conclusions arrived at from tradition, from hasty and unjustifiable presumptions and from the establishment of error by those who knew not what they did. Teaching, with the peculiar value of long acceptance, which has been the subject of instruction by parents and esteemed expounders, and held in reverence for a lifetime, is not a matter which one who reveres the Master can subject to severe scrutiny cheerfully. When careful scrutiny reveals devastating flaws, searching pain may ensue. But cowardice may be the ally of ill-founded fidelity and, in this supremely important matter, retreat is intolerable.

The structure of orthodox Christianity rests on the dogmas of the Virgin Birth, the death on the cross and the Resurrection from the dead, by which we are assured, the world was saved, has been saved, or will be saved; and that, deprived of these dogmas, Christendom would collapse. Can the Churches refer us to any utterance of the Master to justify this teaching? Reliance on the Churches is shattered by failure to find that he ever claimed, even by implication, that he was born of a virgin espoused by God; or that there is any good evidence that he died on the cross, or, therefore, that he rose from the dead. Will any responsible person assert that the world is saved? Will the Churches tell us quite simply just what they mean by that expression, and where may be found the authority of the Master for its use? Nor—it may be noted in passing—did the Master found any Church in the sense taught by the Churches.<sup>1</sup> Will the Churches dare to deny that it is because they do not see any sign of the world being “saved” by their doctrines and methods, that, to their credit, they are going through the ordeal of heart-searching? If the Master had been the subject of the most wonderful birth ever, surely he would have been hailed as such on returning to his native village; yet, on the Gospels’ own shewing, as soon as he spoke in public, he was recognised as the son of Joseph the carpenter. On the same evidence it is questionable as to whether this was in terms of laudatory wonder, or deprecatory doubt.

It is disturbing to find that although the Gospels are printed first in the New Testament, they were not the first attempts at

<sup>1</sup> The case against Paul as to this is serious but that is matter for separate study.

biography of the Master (*Luke* alludes to others and proceeds to give his own) and that they were certainly discoloured by what the fertile Paul taught—according to his friend and biographer the said *Luke*, in *The Acts*, written many years before the Gospels. It ought to be remembered that Paul never met the Master; and it is doubtful whether Mark or *Luke* did, so that Paul only knew by hearsay, while Mark and *Luke* relied to some extent on the reports of eye-witnesses. As to that, it is notorious how the reports of eye-witnesses of the identical scene vary—as will be illustrated here later. Neither *Mark* nor *Luke* say anything about the Virgin birth: *Luke* in fact traces the Master's ancestry back to Adam, while *Matthew*, a Hebrew, begins at Abraham. It is true that he narrates as to Virgin birth as if fact, but it cannot be said that it is infused with enthusiasm, and the explanation reasonably is that he was trying to reconcile the religion of his own birth, with that of his adoption. As Paul is given such a prominent place by hosts of Christians, his silence as to the Virgin birth can only mean that either he had never heard of it, or did not believe it. Hannay, in his monumental, disquieting, and even devastating work,<sup>1</sup> cites twenty-eight 'saviours' born of virgins to save mankind. He recalls that "all sun myths begin by having the sun born of a virgin." He is satisfied that the Master was born in late September, and states that when the Roman Church reformed the calendar the birth date was fixed as December 25th to agree with the "'*Natalis Invicta Solis*' whose festival was held at the Winter solstice by all pagans"—another attempt at an impossible reconciliation. "The sun," writes Hannay "is received with rejoicing as he comes to save man from starvation."

It ought to be particularly noted that John, the Master's intimate friend (if he was indeed the author of the Fourth Gospel in its final form) not only ignores the birth stories, but opens his book with a grandeur of percipience, noble and profound. "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the word was God." He was probably near ninety when he wrote,—the wise aspect of age! Yet as one reads on how impossible it becomes to accept the feat of memory displayed as reliable in the detail so greatly desired! As to the earliest Gospel, Dr. Bevan has commented, "We have only what St. Mark recollected, of what St. Peter recollected, of what Jesus said some thirty-eight years before St. Peter's death—and that, translated from Aramaic into Greek." Moreover, it is submitted as just reasoning, that if the Master had known that he was the most wonderfully begotten child ever, and had deemed it important to the 'saving of the World,' with himself as the Divinely appointed means, he would not have been silent about it—as in fact he was, for the most excellent reasons! According to Writ deemed Holy, when the Master did anything dramatic, he almost implored witnesses to treat it as a secret.

<sup>1</sup> *Christianity* by J. B. Hannay, F.R.S.E., F.C.S.: Francis Griffiths, London, 1913.



(Observe how the request has been respected!) Why did he do this, if these acts were deemed vital to his mission? It is further submitted that it was precisely because he deemed these as relatively unimportant; that he very earnestly desired that they be not associated nor confused with his real Mission, which he perceived his companions were not comprehending.

As to "Behold! a virgin shall conceive and bear a son," all mothers begin as virgins but at the appointed time pass into potential maternity: and we know that the mother of the Master was a perfectly normal woman who bore other children. Reference to *The Encyclopaedia Biblica* will disclose that eminent scholars have rejected the idea that it refers to the suffering Messiah. Surely, to civilised, informed people, and still more to those of spiritual understanding, the ineffable value of the Master's mission does not arise from, nor rely on, how his physical body got born! Detachment and courage are essentials here. Consider also the inconsistency of the Churches in this matter. They extol the unique circumstances in which they profess to believe, yet incessantly, and literally, chant embarrassing allusions to "non-abhorrence," thus in their ruthless zeal, trespassing on territory elsewhere, and absolutely, respected. If these unhappy intrusive allusions are justified, why do the Churches claim that the Master instituted marriage, and they, as organisations bless it, welcome children, and honour parenthood? Add to this, the impossibility of proving the truth of what they inculcate, while asserting it as Truth. In any other sphere of human association, it would incur severe condemnation.

Let us look now at the dogma as to the death on the cross. Hannay names twenty-six 'saviours' who were "crucified or died otherwise to save the world": twelve at whose death there were convulsions of Nature: eleven who "descended into hell," and twenty-two for whom was claimed the achievement of resurrection.

In 1846, Marian Evans translated Strauss's *Life of Jesus* into English. The conclusion from that was: "The cultivated intellect of the present day has very decidedly stated the following dilemma: 'Either Jesus was not wholly dead, or he did not really rise again.'"<sup>1</sup> In 1865, Samuel Butler published at his own expense a booklet entitled *The Evidence for the Resurrection of Jesus Christ as given by the Four Gospels, critically examined*. His friend and biographer, Festing Jones, summarised it thus:

"Butler came to the conclusion that Christ did not die on the Cross but that he swooned and recovered consciousness after the body had passed into the keeping of Joseph of Arimathea."<sup>2</sup>

Into the mind of the reader will immediately come *The Brook Kerith* by George Moore, evoking a variety of emotions; but it is not a work which the just mind will dismiss as of no more than literary value. The present writer has no knowledge as to whether

<sup>1</sup> *George Elliot* by Gerald Bullett: Collins, 1947.

<sup>2</sup> *Samuel Butler: a memoir*, by H. Festing Jones: Macmillan, 1919.

Moore was indebted to Butler. No acknowledgment appears in the Ebury Edition, and it may be accepted that Moore worked quite independently.<sup>1</sup> By implication in his Dedication of *The Brook Kerith*, he relied on his own analytical study of the New Testament. Butler knew all about the Strauss theory but applied himself with characteristic thoroughness to examine the Gospels, using only the evidence found there. When, on Moore's 80th birthday, a too daring interviewer referred to "the very ancient legend" as to Christ not dying on the cross, Moore came very near and said with a raised voice, "I should think it is ancient. I'm telling you that it is in the Gospel itself. Have you read Luke's account of Christ meeting His disciples after the Crucifixion? It is all there." He added that it was extraordinary how many learned people when told by him that certain things are, or are not, in the Gospels, found that he was right: that he simply read the Gospels and found what he wanted, there.<sup>2</sup>

The skilful condensation of Butler by Festing Jones just quoted is quite inadequate in conveying any idea of Butler's industry and ability in making good his case; those who do not know the work should study *The Fair Haven*<sup>3</sup> where every relevant passage in the Gospels has been gone into with the care of an actuary and the acumen of a judge, with results quite disintegrating to those commonly accepted. This work is probably unique in its masterly condemnation of what it pretends to advocate. In it, Butler makes use of the 1865 booklet, already mentioned. Limitations of space prevent the quotation it deserves, but a sample may whet the appetite.

Accepting noon as the hour when the Master was finally led forth, Butler makes allowance for the dialogue, the final preparations, and the procession. "By 6 p.m., by consent of all the writers, the body was entombed, so that the actual time on the cross, etc., was little more than four hours. Let us be thankful in the hope that the time may have been so short, but say five hours, say six. The crucifixion was avowedly too hurried for death in an ordinary sense to have ensued. The thieves had to be killed, as yet alive. Immediately before being taken down from the cross, the body was delivered" (*sic*: he must mean, assigned), "to friends. Within thirty-six hours . . . the tomb . . . was discovered open: for how long, we do not know, but a few hours later Christ was seen alive." (p.211). Moore need not be accepted as authoritative, but he may be regarded as accurate where a statement is verifiable. He presents

<sup>1</sup> It is remarkable that both had early history, interestingly near common. Moore had been a Christian of the Roman Catholic Church, though rebellious; and eventually broke away from it. Butler was the son of an austere Canon of the Church of England and had got as far as preparing for ordination, when he experienced such disillusionment that he rebelled and, certainly in spirit, broke from orthodox Christianity.

<sup>2</sup> *Manchester Guardian Weekly*: 26.2.'32.

<sup>3</sup> Fifield, 1913 also Watts: Thinker's Library, No. 70, 1938. Page references are to 1913 edn.



the centurion as saying to Joseph of Arimathea: "The thieves are lucky. Were it not for their Sabbath, they would last on for three or four days"; and Pilate, when the death was reported, was reported as muttering, "He could bear the cross but for three hours." (pp.228—230). Butler proceeds thus. "Let it be remembered that the fact that the body had been delivered to Joseph of Arimathea *before* the taking down from the cross, greatly enhanced the chance of an escape from death, inasmuch as the duties of the soldiers would have ended with the presentation of the order from Pilate." (p.212). Butler recalls that, according to *Mark*, the centurion had recognised the Master as "the son of God. Would he not be inclined to give Him every assistance in his power: he would be frightened and anxious to get the body down. Besides, Joseph was rich; and rich people have many ways of getting their wishes attended to." (p.212). Moore *dramatises* this theory. Butler reminds us that: "We know of no one assisting at the taking down or the removal of the body, except Joseph of Arimathea. . . . None of the Apostles appear to have had anything to do with the deposition." (p.213). "We cannot find that there was any such examination of the body as would be absolutely necessary in order to prove that a man had been dead who was afterwards seen alive." (p.205). "For the death of Christ, there is no evidence at all. There is evidence that he was believed to have been dead—under circumstances where a misapprehension was singularly likely to arise—by men whose minds were altogether on a different 'clef' to ours as to the miraculous and whom we therefore cannot fairly judge by any modern standard (p.210). If Christ re-appeared alive, there is not only no tittle of evidence in support of his death which would be allowed in an English court of justice, but there is overwhelming evidence which points inexorably in the direction of his never having died. If he reappeared, there is no evidence of his having died. If he did not appear, there is no evidence of his having risen from the dead" (p.205). It should be borne in mind—and is too often lost sight of—that *we have no account of the Resurrection from any source whatever*. We have accounts of certain women who found the tomb empty, but this is not an account of a resurrection. We are told that Jesus was seen alive, but this again is not an account of a resurrection. We hear nothing about the emerging from the tomb." (p.177). To that, Butler adds, "We only meet with this, when we come to the Italian painters," an observation of excelling interest.<sup>1</sup>

Butler held that, "consciously or unconsciously" many of our conceptions were sown by the great painters and sculptors. "These men have been the most potent of our theologians" (p.208).

Butler was arrested by the conflict between accounts of what

<sup>1</sup> Consider the potency of pictorial presentation. Note how Roman Catholicism has made the utmost of this with the "Stations": the Holy Figures, the Bleeding Heart effigies, the manger scenes in stucco and straw. They are "large as life" and, to the minds for whom they are designed, as true as life.

took place on the memorable Sunday morning. He commented thus: "*Mark, Luke, and John* concur . . . that when the women came to the tomb . . . very early on the Sunday morning, they found it *already empty*: the stone was gone when they came there. According to *John*, there was not even an angelic vision for some time after. There is nothing in these accounts to preclude the possibility of the stone's having been removed within an hour or two of the body's being laid in the tomb. But when we turn to *Matthew*, we find all changed. . . . The stone was gone *not* when the women came, but that on their arrival, there was a great earthquake, and that an angel came down from Heaven, rolled away the stone, and *sat on it*." (139).

When we compare Luke's account with John's, we are at once struck with the resemblances and discrepancies. *Luke* and *John* are agreed that Christ was seen alive after the crucifixion. Both agree that the tomb was found empty very early on the Sunday morning (*i.e.*, within thirty-six hours of the deposition). Neither writer affords us any clue whatever as to the time and manner of the removal of the body; but here the resemblance ends. The Angelic vision of Mary, seen *after* Peter and John had departed, and apparently by Mary alone, in *Luke* has its place in the van of the narrative; and Peter is represented as having gone to the the tomb *not in consequence of having been told that the body of Christ was missing, but because he refused to believe the miraculous story which was told by the women.* (Butler's emphasis). In the Fourth Gospel we hear of no miraculous story being carried by Mary to Peter and John." (p.195).

Butler comments that, instead of being seen by one person (*John*), the angels are now seen "*by many*," while the women, instead of being stolid, bow their faces to the earth. "Strange," he adds "that they should need reminding of prophecy. Stranger still that—a few verses later—we find the Apostles remembering no prophetic saying but regarding the story of the women as mere idle tales. (195—6). We cannot believe in a miracle, no matter how deeply ingrained into the creeds of the civilised world, merely because it was believed by 'unlettered fishermen' 2000 years ago. This is not a source from which such an event should be received without the closest investigation. We know that the Apostles were sincere men, and that they firmly believed that Jesus Christ had risen from the dead. . . . That Christ's having been crucified and afterwards seen alive, would be enough, under the circumstances to incline the men of the day to believe that he had died; but we should ourselves be bound to make a far more searching enquiry before we could arrive at any such conclusion." (176).

It is characteristic of Butler's generosity that having shrived the recorders of the slightest intention to mislead, he wrote: "If we had been the favoured friends of one whom we believed to have died, yet was not beholden to death, no matter how judicially minded we might be, we should be blind to everything except that we



had once been the chosen companions of an immortal." (186).

He employs a remarkable phrase: "It would uproot the hedges of our caution." (186). "Can we wonder then, if we feel so strongly concerning events which are huddled down upon the horizon of time, that those who lived in the thick of them should have been possessed with an all absorbing ecstasy? Assuredly there is no blame on the score of credulity to be attached to those who propagated the Christian religion, but the beliefs, natural and lawful to them are, if natural, not lawful to us: they should be resisted: they do not form any legitimate ground for faith. If faith means only believing history upon insufficient evidence, we deny the merit of faith: on the contrary we regard it as one of the most deplorable of errors—as sapping . . . all the moral and intellectual faculties" (178/9). "We cannot judge *them* (minds on a clef altogether different from ours) but, we are bound to weigh the facts which they relate, not in their balance, but in our own." (210/11).

"There is no tittle of evidence of his death which would be allowed in an English court of justice." (205).

Festing Jones' summing-up of Butler in this matter has been quoted, with its reference to Joseph of Arimathea. The last man to see the Master before the entombment: the man who carried through the entombment: the last man to see the body before it was left there; how very remarkable that so important a character in this tremendous drama has been given attention in ratio almost inverse to that importance. Is it just possible that the silence of ecclesiasticism has been studied? Neither Butler nor Moore pass over his importance, and the New Testament writers were not blind to it, though for more simple reasons. *Matthew* describes Arimathea as a disciple and rich (ch. 27, v. 57). *Mark* says he was "an honourable counsellor who waited for the Kingdom of God" (ch. 15, v. 43). *Luke* says he was "a good man and just," and uses the exact words of *Matthew* as to waiting for the Kingdom. *John* says he was a disciple "but secretly, for fear of the Jews" (ch. 19, v. 38). Clearly he was a man of substance and integrity; well-known, wise, and respected by Rome. He must have cared very deeply for the Master and have been courageous, for he goes to Pilate and succeeds in getting the body assigned to him for burial.

Butler wrote: "We know of no one assisting at the taking-down except Joseph, for the presence of Nicodemus rests on slender evidence" (212-3). The inert body is conveyed to Joseph's "own tomb," which is not without significance. How deeply many must feel that Arimathea is the one person who could have told us so much that we long to know! But the facts, as elicited by Butler, so converge to the inevitable, that there is meagre scope for the imagination. Moore as the artist in words enjoys putting in details, but they do not outrage credulity as do the Italian artists in oil and colour.

All the records agree as to the tomb being Arimathea's private

property. *Matthew* and *Mark* name the women who were at the sepulchre. *Luke* only refers to "the women." *John* does not mention them at all, and is the only one to bring Nicodemus into this scene. *Luke* says it was the women who brought the spices. *John* said it was Nicodemus—"100-lbs. weight." "Then," says *John*, "took they the body of Jesus, and wound it in linen clothes with the spices as the manner of the Jews is to bury." This suggests that the enwrapping was done at the place of deposition. It is a moment of the utmost dramatic tenseness. As Arimathea caringly handles the maltreated body, he makes the fearful, shocking discovery that—it is *not* dead! For the man we have seen him to be (and Nicodemus too if he was there) it thrusts into life a situation full of distracting menace. Much has been risked to do reverence to the One beloved and revered. Victim of judicial murder, the body has been assigned to him by Pilate—almost a friend—on the assumption and the assurance of the centurion that it is a dead body. And now—the distracted question, "What is to be done?" Quick or dead, the body must be dealt with: a quick decision imperative. The only immediate practical thing is to proceed with the 'embalming'; entomb the body, and as soon as ever possible and prudent take steps towards succour. The alternative? Report the discovery and have the most horrible things done to one much-loved! The remorse would be unendurable: quite impossible. Nothing is tolerable but to proceed according to the assumption of those in power. Butler wrote: "Joseph and Nicodemus (supposing him there) may be believed to have thought that Christ was dead . . . but they could not refuse him their assistance when they found out their mistake: nor could they forfeit their high position by allowing it to be known that they had restored the life of one obnoxious to the authorities." (215). And thus, as far as Roman and Jew are concerned, "Jesus of Nazareth," disappears for ever. It has been left to Samuel Butler to point out that Arimathea and Nicodemus also disappear. "It is noticeable that we never hear of them again, for there were no two people in the world better able to know whether the resurrection was miraculous or not, and none who would be more deeply interested in favour of the miracle." (p.215).

Moore is very sensible of the predicament of Arimathea (p.255: Ebury Edn.) and it is remarkable that he presents him as "killed in the streets of Jerusalem by order of the zealots" in revenge.

As to the Ascension, there is literally next to nothing of any evidential value. As to this Butler reminds us that *Matthew* and "the author of the Fourth Gospel" are silent; and as to Paul, thus: "In no part of his genuine writings, does he give any sign of his having been aware that any story existed. . . . Where then does it come from if neither *Matthew*, *Mark*, *John*, nor Paul appear to have heard of it? From a single verse in St. Luke's gospel, written more than half a century after the supposed event when few or none of those supposed to have seen it were living or within



reach to contradict it. It gives the place as Bethany (p.227) whereas, if there is anything whatever in words of *Matthew* (ch. 26, v. 32): 'I will go before you into Galilee,' it was not Bethany." (The authenticity of the last verses of *Mark* are in great doubt. Verse 19 is mere assertion).

Need it be added—and yet it had better be—that the words: "I am the Resurrection and the life," could not have had any applicability to the ordeal on Calvary as it had not taken place; that it did not have any literal meaning, and was not intended to have; but this profound allegory has also been materialised. It can not be enlarged on now. No student, and especially a theological student, should neglect to read Samuel Butler's, *The Fair Haven*, nor hesitate to require from instructors answers on the assertions of Ecclesiasticism that will warrant reliance.

Let it be supposed for the time it takes to offer the illustration, that these dogmas in which the Churches demand belief, could be established as fact: how do they help poor mortals to live better lives and transcend the difficulties of human experience? Do the emphases by those who put such tremendous value on them, reveal the propounders as persons of spiritual discernment and enlightenment? Where is the evidence of success in their propagation? What leadership have they inspired in time of crises? and what relevance do they have to anything the Master taught? Because they cannot be substantiated it is submitted that they are *obstructions* to all that the Churches profess eagerness to accomplish.

While not being technically 'Dogma,' there are certain hymns which are rooted in it. "The Church's one foundation" is *not* "Jesus Christ the Lord" nor is it "His own creation" by any means. The Master did not found any Church in the sense and form in which we are asked to support it; and to some, the symbology of his coming to "seek her to be His Holy bride" and subsequently dying for her is—exercising restraint—unfortunate, unhappy, and maladroit. Are other brides unholy? To make a song about this, grates harshly on the ear. And how wrong to make intelligent people sing "by schisms rent asunder" and, anon, "All one body we . . . Join our happy throng," If hell's foundations quiver, it cannot be from fear. According to Whitaker there are some thirty Christian denominations; and he does not name the oldest, the Coptics. It seems very lacking in reverence and even dignity for the Churches to present such spectacles.

Butler's thesis has been referred to, in terms of deprecative indulgence, as a theory. As he has given evidence, chapter and verse, from the New Testament records (and far more fully than has been possible to quote here) this gesture of dismissal cannot succeed: and it may be reasonably and urgently asked: where is Orthodoxy's evidence in support of its assertions and claims? Do they exist? This ought to be answered squarely and the questions welcomed. As matters stand, the case against the Churches is that, offering the People

the strengthfulness of an oak, inspection reveals it to be hollow, and thus the People suffer double and distressing dis-illusionment.

Generations of the most splendid people have been brought up on a diet of Dogma and Paulinity very indigestibly mixed, while behind it all stood the great Central Figure; and suffusing it with the utmost potency, the virtues of the Gentle Jesus, the Loving Jesus, the healing, kind, benign Jesus, ever attentive, ever protective ("He will carry you through"), winsome and reliable, who knew all about human sorrow and pain and faithlessnesses, in whose arms you might feel eternally safe. The potency of this was, and remains, very very great. Let it be noted that it does not rely one *iota* on the Virgin Birth, the Death on the Cross, the Resurrection, nor on what Paul said or thought, but on the manifestation of the divine qualities in action. And that—let thanks be given!—does not rely on Cardinals, and Archbishops, and Clergy, and Creeds, and Beliefs or any other creature of human invention. If we are to approach the Kingdom as "little children" we are not required to leave outside our God-endowed intelligence, and blindly to accept as Divine Truth what congressions of mortals have decided to *declare* and promulgate as Truth. It will not do for defenders to try to dismiss these challenges as the presumptions of a mere unlettered layman, clearly of no theological scholarship. For whom do the Churches exist? Whom are they gasping to win? Have they any reason to expect to win people to accept ready-made beliefs that will not survive examination and which, in simple solemn fact, are not related to the teaching of the Master? The dogmatists had better be mindful of the warning against offending any of the 'little ones' and the fate, associated with millstones, of such offenders. If this has a harsh sound, it is not the sound of querulous fault-finding but of dismay, regret and sorrow, laced with vexation, that men endowed with a great Message, provided with a great reservoir of Living Water, with the means of much power for much good, should have brought us to an impasse that cannot any longer be concealed. It is not a situation in which mere harshness has any useful place, but neither does it permit Levitical detachment. There is recurrent talk about reuniting the Churches. How wistful it is, while the first essential is for them all to recognise the lack of spiritual vitality in all their dictums and pontifications, the futility of their endless evasions and discursivenesses, and face the fact of the deadly sickness induced by their obtuseness, their lack of spiritual discernment and their moral cowardice.

"They build their houses with sand and play with empty shells. Children, they play on the seashore of worlds. They know not how to swim: they know not how to cast nets. Pearl divers dive for Pearls, Merchants sail their ships; but Children gather pebbles and scatter them again. They seek not for hidden treasure, they know not how to cast nets."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Rabindranath Tagore: *Gitanjali* No. 60.



## INTEGRITY

Better be blind; no more look on the leaf  
or rainbow or the spray of dancing seas;  
no more look on the forms of fellow-men,  
watching their faces; troubled; or at ease  
with life, day's dawn and dusk, each moment's gifts,  
and smiling placidly with circumstance.

Better be deaf; no more to hear the call  
of friend to friend, the salutation dear;  
no more to hear rich music filling out  
the soul, until with rapturous voice this claims  
brief stay in heaven.

Better be dumb; no more with facile tongue  
toss out the jest; or, in some weightier tone,  
propound mere knowledge, dedicate some art  
whose bright conceit may be the brittle cloak  
of deeper ignorance; no more to sing  
or knit the valleys with wild hollowing.

Better be these and lamer yet than these,  
with all my powers one ruined dynasty,  
than turn in spirit to that alien road  
where untruth paves the way and baleful airs,  
made noxious by unbridled blasphemy,  
destroy the flame that lights the path to God.

WM. EWART WALKER

HE COMES.

He comes!  
Unasked, unnoticed,  
Sometimes unexpected  
And scarce welcome;  
Quietly, without drum  
Or herald trumpeting,  
He comes!

Ask you how  
This thing I know?  
I will not throw  
A shroud about the fact  
That, golden and glory-packed,  
Smiling with love, He stands  
Here now!

BRUCE FINDLOW

# Unbelief?

ENID SHEARS

**J**UST lately I have been indulging in a deliberate attempt to strip my beliefs of all assertions which cannot rightly be called authentic facts as distinguished from those arising out of faith, hope, hypothesis, hearsay, and so on. One of my never-very-firmly-held beliefs was that man, as an individual, has an immortal soul of which he remains possessed after the demise of his earthly body; that he has something personal, perpetual and fundamental about him which distinguishes him from a pebble or any one of the less complex units of nature.

Getting right down to the subject, I have been toying with the idea that man *could* be a mere lump of sensitive matter with an internal mechanism called a conscious mind which, coupled with a brain, a long memory, a voice, emotions, dexterity, mobility, talents, etc., gives the life within him a great deal more play and scope for personal development than the pebble, and makes his comparatively short span on earth as an individual more noticeable, with a more diverse effect on his surroundings.

Let us assume that a baby is born, is kept in absolute seclusion away from as many outside influences as possible, is fed with a sufficient minimum of vitamins to keep him physically, if not mentally, healthy, and lives to maturity. Granted that the seclusion itself will be one vital element in the influences which contribute to whatever personality emerges at maturity and that the light without which he probably could not survive, is another; that the sort of food he eats will affect his grey matter; that the absolute minimum of attention necessary from birth to keep him alive will still distinguish him from the pebble. What is there in this conditioned man which will give evidence that he will become immortal, as an entity, whereas the pebble will not?

I am bound, on this line of reasoning, to admit that there is precious little! But it is this very conclusion which forces me to go beyond the individual in my search for the facts—the unassailable facts—which are to compose any belief I can reasonably hold. I am, after all, trying to get at the truth, and one doesn't stop at consideration of the part in order to get at the truth concerning the whole.

If, in the last resort, man is merely a complex, delicately balanced mechanism (and there is no real evidence to support the contention that he isn't) with three score years and ten in which to affect and be affected by his natural and social surroundings, then the next step is to pursue the matter and include this phenomenon in its wider context; to see if there is any known fact about the whole of which he is a part.

Even supposing, as I say, that man is merely a collection of atoms co-ordinated into a lump of impressionable matter which is part of a group known as the human species, there still is, vouched for in my own experience, the fact of his existence, whether he be an inarticulate moron who may not be aware of it, or whether he be a Jesus Christ who could say "Before Abraham was I am."

My belief begins to assert itself!—but it is not the belief that man, even a Jesus, has a separate immortal soul. It seems that the individual 'unit', of whatever organic or inorganic group, must be the subject of some cosmic plan to further some design which appears to be implicit in the laws of nature, though we may not know what it is.

I look at space. I know that, if there at all, it must be infinite, and I therefore know that there must be some 'point' at which the infinity of Space and Time must merge with the Power which must be running this highly efficient concern in which man finds himself long ages after the inception of the world in which he lives—itsself part of an infinitely greater concern. I try to look at it as a whole. I see that the units are all inter-related; that it is impossible to live one's life entirely independently of any external influences whatever. I look at the pebble and I know that, but for the rock beneath my feet of which the pebble is an offshoot, I could have no continued existence. I know that *all* other manifestations play their part, remotely or immediately, in my own development as an individual, for even segregation from most of them would vitally affect my development.

Have I taken into account all the possible relevant factors? Supposing that the physical world is all illusion? Even in that case, I am still in possession of the fact of my own conscious awareness of my own existence which I did not create myself but which must be accountable for by some agency forerunning and indwelling me, which is sufficient proof that there is something called Life. I cannot assert that Life is the first cause which we are in the habit of calling God. I can only assert that if Life is not God, then God preceded Life in which case God could not be described as a living God. If Life preceded God, then God could not be called that first cause which we habitually suppose God to be. It seems legitimate to suppose, then, that the terms are synonymous.

Having, by I hope a logical process, established the fact known as Life to my own personal satisfaction, and that it must have forerun and produced me while at the same time sustaining and indwelling me, I cannot see where the existence of a local, individual soul comes in, though I can see that there is a "soul of all things" of which my own affirmed existence is the sure and certain proof, even though I, as an individual lump of complex and conscious mechanism may cease at some unspecified date to be able to affirm it.

How much further can I get in my belief—or rather, at what point short of this comprehensive belief can I halt with honesty?





# *Religion and the Next Development in Man*

HOWARD L. PARSONS, PH.D.

IN 1941-43 in England, when Western civilisation shook and crumbled under the shock of world war, a British scientist, Lancelot Law Whyte, witnessing the terrible death-pangs of an epoch, brought forth a book, *The Next Development in Man*,\* which is, in many ways, the prophetic good news of our time.

The book bears the marks of having been born in a time of tension and great turmoil. Indeed, man's tension and turmoil are its theme, a theme interwoven in counterpoint with man's unitary development. Out of the depths of Western despair, dissolution, and death, Whyte proclaims the rising of a new life. Out of the social chaos and individual disintegration, out of the industrial sadism of war and the static sterility of thought, out of the failure of science and religion, a new and creative world is born. Standing at the crux of human history, and surveying past, present, and future in one unitary vision, Whyte with prophetic insight into Europe, America and Asia, tells us of our glorious past and our long decline, and foretells the glory on earth that might be ours if we will but submit to history and seize its opportunities. Running through all is the theme of man's unitary development. The death of the past gives birth to the children of the present; and to facilitate the development of the contemporary generation man must understand the failures of the past and the tendencies of development at work here and now, so that he may ease the unfolding destiny of his children. As in that other great transformation in history, the transition from the Ancient Period to the European Epoch in the first millennium B.C., when men like Socrates and Plato, Alexander and Caesar, Jesus and Paul proved their greatness "because they were in a profound sense the willing agents of a new general need" (78, 62)—so to-day we must understandingly respond to the cataclysmic challenge of our time—the transition from the dissociation and dualism of European man to the creative development of unitary man in a unitary world.

But our task requires something more than theirs: a consciousness of the processes in man and in history, and "the formulation of a universal method of thought at once true to nature . . . and appropriate to present-day human nature so that men and women everywhere can find a common ground in using it." This universal method is unitary thought, which discovers in every process in nature

\*Cresset Press, London, 1944. Reprinted in Mentor Edition (35c) 1950. Page references cited are to these editions *seriatim*.

(and therefore in man) a formative tendency, a developmental process of increasing symmetry or order. In man this process rises to its highest level in mind, which can in turn facilitate man's whole organic development. Hence the necessity for man to understand himself if he is to develop in accordance with his innate capacities.

For Whyte "Organic integration is the dominant fact, disintegration can only be temporary, if a species is to survive." (48-9, 32). "The factor which stabilises and harmonises all the component processes in the individual and in society is not permanence but development." (49, 33). According to this creative principle, which characterises man, all of man's behaviour, his successes and failures, his institutions and thought forms, his religion and science, his past and future, can be explained. "Man abhors the absence of integration. He demands integration, and will create religions, achieve heroic self-sacrifice, pursue mad ambitions, or follow the ecstasy of danger, rather than live without." (165, 148). By and large, man's historical past has been marked by illusory and futile efforts to recover a primitive, simple integration, and World War II signalises the end of that nightmare. But man's future beckons with the vision of a new man, whose unitary science can guide him into an unprecedented Age of Integration, deep and complex and diversified, delicate in detail and magnificent in scope.

In explaining man's fall from primitive integration, Whyte discusses the origin and function of religion, and passes judgment on it. Henceforward we shall limit our attention to his treatment of religion, and in particular the Judaic-Christian religion, since he concerns himself with the history of man in the West.

But before narrowing ourselves we must first acknowledge that we are passing by a wealth of detail caught up in the sweep of Whyte's thought, and are thereby distorting not only his general thesis but also the particular points we want to make. Whyte's book is a rich mine of insight and prophecy, of intuition and analysis, of biology and history, of psychology and sociology, of science and philosophy. Indeed, it has the passion and singleness of aim which mark much of religion. Some people will not understand it even after a sincere effort; others will (if only vaguely) understand it, resent it, and seek to annihilate it. Because the "hero is a man who has discovered that his finite life can only express the universal if he stakes it without reserve," and because "integrated man by his mere existence challenges fate," "his integrity is resented by the divided, and sooner or later his difference from the rest destroys him." (223, 206). Religious leaders may resent Whyte; but they resented Jesus, Huss, Luther, Fox, Gandhi. But, because unitary thought in unitary man is itself a transvalued religion, and claims to show the necessity for transvaluing the old religions, it is important for us to devote our attention to it.

For perhaps a million years of his pre-historical existence on this planet man lived in primeval innocence, guided by instincts



and by primitive verbal suggestions which maintained his organic and social harmony and balance. In this period no distinctions were apparent between individual and society, thing and symbol, body and mind, fact and ideal. About 8000 B.C. civilisations emerged, and with them script, full speech, agriculture, stock-breeding, bronze, cities, specialisation. This period, lasting up till 1000 B.C. and called the period of Ancient Man, was dominated by one tendency—"complex and extended patterns of deliberate behaviour" (75, 58)—although instinct still controlled man and secured his integration. "Thought was concrete," and harmony was biological.

But some time before the first millennium B.C. a very important change began to assert itself. On the social side this change expressed itself in "three great processes"—the development of great empires (Egypt, China, Persia), of monotheism (Ikhnaton and Moses), and of rationalism (culminating in Plato). On the individual side the change took the form of "the attraction of man's attention to a novel field, the mental processes occurring in himself. The outward-looking pagan became introspective; man became aware of moral conflict, aware of himself, and aware of his own separation from nature. Knowledge of conflict led to self-consciousness and to the sense of guilt. Man fell from innocence." (78,61).

Why? With the uncertainty of standards produced by the interaction and clash of civilisations by travel and communication, with the failure of the old instinctive balance, the individual was thrown back on his own mental processes for restoring the certainty of equilibrium. As a consequence his attention was drawn to these processes and he became self-conscious, separating the permanence of his self and his thought from the bewildering variety and transiency of social situations, and developing certain *universal* ideas and ideals which might guide him through the maze of upsetting external circumstances. Man's biological nature, with its inherent duality, brought on and reinforced this separation of self and society, of ideas and facts. For man's sense organs and afferent nerves tended to draw his attention to the immediate, qualitative flux and chaos of events, setting off automatic, instinctual responses; while his specialised cortex tended to delay responses and produce permanent forms (thoughts) remembered through time. Thus the social situation amplified and stretched into a sharp dualism what was already a duality implicit in the nature man. The dualism took the form of deliberation/instinct, permanence/change, abstract/concrete, theory/intuition, idea/fact, mind/body, spirit/flesh, conservation/spontaneity, quantity/quality, space/time, subjective/objective, form/process, idealism/materialism, heaven/earth, man/woman, individual/society, freedom/necessity. (These pairs of opposites are not strictly parallel: quantitative science was materialistic, since a materialistic interpretation of nature best lent itself to the demands of the quantitative method; and the individual soul,

though the locus of the necessary forms of experience, was conceived to be somehow free).

Why did man identify his mental processes (sometimes called "spirit", since they are what distinguished him from the rest of nature and provided him with "eternal objects" in the midst of flux) with the good? And why did he identify the other side of his nature, his flesh and his instincts, with the evil? For one thing, European man—who is Ancient Man become aware about 1500 B.C.—with his emphasis on mentality and universal ideas, was in revolt against "the degenerate life of the ancient world" (85, 68). In that world, Ancient Man, with his new-found material security and technical power, had deliberately cultivated his instinctual appetites and so had thrown the organism out of its natural integration. (Thus man's religion developed in reaction to excessive sensualism, and is itself an excess on the other side). For another thing, the community preached the priority of the mental or spiritual, since that capacity in man aided in social cohesion and racial survival. Thus, religion developed around social tabu, and is static, negative, and anti-individualistic. Moreover—and this is the important point for us—"ideas, and in particular the new religious idea offered a means of integrating life—even though partially—and so were accepted and developed. What we call 'religion' is the operation of a partial substitute for complete organic integration." (86, 69).

This is Whyte's first criticism of religion: its "narcissism." Man had fallen in love with one aspect of himself, the mental, and had deified it and damned the rest; he had absolutized the relative, had set up as an idol a created good, taking it to be the Creative Good. Viewing himself from the transcendent perspective of his newly discovered ideals, which had completely enthralled him, man knew himself, and found himself wanting, and felt ashamed. We should add, as Erich Fromm points out in interpreting Adam's fall, and as Whyte would no doubt agree, that man's guilt was a function of his attaining the knowledge and power of the supreme social authorities—the gods—and was accompanied by hostility and destructiveness directed not toward an authoritarian society but toward his self and the obvious and intractable part of his self, namely, the body. Man's reverence for the spiritual was compensated for by an equal and opposite reaction against the sensual. Thus, says Whyte, "Man fell from innocence to sensuality and monotheism." (85, 68). The One God he professed to worship expressed only part of his total nature, and hence can be interpreted by us as an ineffectual attempt by man to achieve a unity which he had lost and toward which he, by nature, strives. "At its root religion is an expression of man's search for unity." (184, 167). But it is a premature and therefore partial expression, since at the time of religion's most noble expression (monotheism) the social tradition and the limited development of man's knowledge permitted only a partial satisfaction of this search for unity.

This criticism of religion's truncated idealism becomes clearer in the light of Whyte's theory of ideals. Every ideal is a sign of the ignorance of the whole; it is an abstraction lifted up out of the welter of rich, concrete process; to regard it as itself concrete is a mistake which some years ago Whitehead termed "the fallacy of misplaced concreteness." To Whyte, this fallacy is a psychological compensation. Any incompleteness of life tends to call out its complement; every unmet need produces a corresponding compensatory action. "Partial love implies partial hate; spirit, sensuality; self-sacrificing compassion, sadism. The denial of any aspect sharpens and preserves it while its acceptance transforms it by bringing it without the process of the whole." (220-1, 204). This subtle dialectic of psychological forces is perhaps nowhere better expressed among psycho-analysts than in the work of Karen Horney.

Thus in our "idealised images" we may see the form of the being we would like to be; but we may also see reflected in them the "dark component," deep in our own natures and tenaciously suppressed, out of which those ideals arise as a kind of simultaneous eclipse, escape, and partial fulfilment, and in striving after which we may put behind ourselves the brokenness of our actual lives and the dissociation and distortion of our past and present. But the ideals may in time be discharged of their power and enchantment, they may be exhausted of their temporary cohesiveness; and then the dissociation will spring open again, the dark component will seize control, extremity and instability, frenzy and frigidity, will reign in the chaotic domain of the soul. Hence, because of this dualism which marks Christianity, Whyte explains the futility of Christianity in lessening war, disease, and hatred. Christians could not be honest and realistic, for at heart they are divided souls, yearning after an irrelevant ideal of mental perfection ("Be ye perfect, even as your Father in heaven is perfect") and consoling themselves with what Nietzsche saw as intrusive, sentimental pity and the "cult of suffering." "If man's view of himself had been complete and his self-love had been whole-hearted," says Whyte, "history would have been different." (86-7, 70). Christians could not, in the sense in which Jesus advised, genuinely love others as themselves; for they love themselves only partially, not with their whole heart and soul and mind and strength. For, as Fromm has said, "an attitude of love toward themselves will be found in all those who are capable of loving others."

A second criticism of religion is that it has been static and inflexible, with a timid and tight narrowness that precludes change, development, and diversity. Its static character is a function of its partial, substitutional, temporary unity. By its very nature "a universal god must be an impostor, for a god is a principle of perfection which compensates the imperfection of each individual man . . ." (92, 76). In Christianity this compensatory ideal took the form of an individual who has completely conquered his sensations,



passions and instincts, and has severed all connections with the world of change and process and, hence, of development.

"The Christian religion, seeking to preserve the source of its limited control over dissociated man, has never accepted integration as the criterion of conduct. It has demanded in addition that the integration shall be of a particular kind, thereby begging the question and prejudicing the possibility of a whole-natured harmony. In this prejudging of the issue Christianity has displayed its lack of acceptance of nature and human nature, its fear of life and its repudiation of man," (222,205).

It is true that progressively, as Christianity found itself in new cultural milieus, it adapted its forms; but those adaptations were always forced from without and were always proscribed by certain fixed moral ideals within the framework of a dualistic interpretation of man.

Christianity, deluded by appearances, has in Whyte's view sold its birthright for a double mess of pottage, which it has balanced inadequately on both shoulders as it wove its unstable way down the centuries. Ironically, the permanence which Christian thinkers imagined they discovered in the forms of the "spirit" now turn out to be the most transitory of things, while the change, the growth and natural decay of "corruptible" terrestrial things, as 2000 years of error testify, is the abiding fact of this universe. What was said of old time, the first shall be last and the last shall be first, is now fulfilled. That which was covered is now revealed. The stone which the builders rejected—Process—is now reinstated as the foundation of all dominions. The wholeness Christians fancied they possessed is now seen for what it is, an artifice and a partiality; blinded by the "pride of the eyes," Christians could not cast its glittering image from them, they could not be whole. "If thy right eye offend thee, pluck it out . . ." They could not follow the radical injunction of Jesus: "Take no thought . . ."

Christianity has sold its birthright because it has betrayed the one who gave it birth. Jesus came not to call the righteous (statically integrated) but the sinners (unintegrated) to repentance. Sinners—excessive sensualists like wine-bibbers, gluttons, prostitutes—are free from the clutch of moral and intellectual forms, free to the perpetual renewal of a dynamic integrity, free from the static, rigid, Pharasaical, professorialised, smug world, a world already moribund in the mansions of its marble philosophy, already mummified in the dry air of its impermanent pyramids. Remember the story of the rich man, who gathered his wealth into barns; the parable might have been told of a philosopher, who dries all his ideas like hay and gathers them into the loft of a system. "Whosoever would save his life must lose it; and whosoever loses his life, for my sake, will find it."

The rigidity of the moral conscience in the Judaic-Christian religion is most apparent in the Judaic side, since the Jew is simply

"a more intense European" whose traits, in isolation, appear very clearly. The Jew's rejection of ancient sensuality, his war on all other standards but his own Absolute, his withdrawal and isolation from outsiders with whom he feared cross-fertilization, his fanatical devotion to strict moral ideals, his displacement of his supremacy into the next world—all these characteristics command a certain admiration and carry their own values, and all can be seen in the Christian tradition. But love of Unity is more important than love of a god who, though perfect in his static heaven, divides personalities and societies. "Integrity supersedes conscience." (98,82).

The Judaic-Christian ideal of one god is highly resistant to change and development for, like every ideal, it grants a security to its devotee which obscures even a dim awareness that the security might be illusory and that something better might lie beyond. "Honest Christians know that doubt is an essential element in their lives; the true Christian is one who discards all hope of security and devotes his whole nature to the struggle with doubt." (222, 205). But apparently there have been few "true Christians" for, following Whyte's analysis, to doubt and to struggle with doubt would lead one to question and eventually reject the static ideals of conventional Christianity. It is true that some forms of Christianity recognise the change and the tragic character of life, but, according to Whyte, these "still pay their due to the general cry for comfort and rob experience of its validity by promising consolation elsewhere." (102, 86). The "superstition" of personal immortality, with a personal god who guarantees the survival of a form which in fact is transient ("dust to dust") has little appeal to one who sees the ultimate as that change and "process here and now which makes each of us what we are." (102, 86). Let us, suggests Whyte, take our standards of mental health seriously: then we will see that the clinging to certain religious notions of static perfection is as neurotic as clinging to the notion that one is appointed by the Deity as saviour of the world—a not uncommon psychosis in our time, for which we consistently lock up some people and let others wreak their paranoia upon the world by atom bombs. The fact is that, in life, change undergirds permanence, and development gives rise to form. "Those who are frustrated by life or weakened by illness tend to desire their own permanence, but those who enjoy health and fulfilment are free to accept process and to proclaim their less prejudiced view." (182, 165)).

The divine ideal in the Judaic-Christian tradition is exclusive. At first glance it appears to facilitate diversity because, as a compensation for the weaknesses of each individual man, monotheism becomes all things to all sorts of conditions of men who fashion or refashion it according to their needs. Thus we may infer that the vaunted syncretism of Christianity is due to an initial vagueness in the god-idea, filled in variously by its millions of interpreters. For Whyte, a true monotheism is a contradiction in terms: "So

long as gods are needed, there will be not one, but many." (92, 76) For this reason, of course, monotheism fostered tolerance and individual development in Europe, and for a long time proved useful in man's development.

But in actuality a loose tolerance always leads to fanaticism, dogmatism, and tyranny, for such tolerance is motivated by the unsocialised, unrealistic, personal need which in its frustration or conflict finds compensatory satisfaction in some personal ideal, or expiates its guilt (over its incipient aggression) by showing an excessive quiet kindness to others. The individual demands that society leave him free to pursue his private god in isolation. In an expanding society (such as 19th century America) such tolerance of privacies is possible. But when social pressures begin to limit the individual and to require of him responsibilities, he is apt to kick against the pricks. The result will be that either his "dark component," his anxiety and guilt, will directly assert itself and seek to suppress (as in himself) the hostility of others; or he will submit himself to the amorphous anonymity of the masses who already have their tyrant. The tolerance of sheer pluralism is dissolved in chaos, for it masks personal needs and drives which have been assimilated neither into the individual personality nor into the social order, and which become respectable and acceptable under the guise of democratic tolerance and "freedom of religion." "Tolerance" in this sense is an irresponsible claim of individuals who want to pursue their own personal distorted ideals but who, when threatened, would annihilate that very diversity which they originally professed to defend—because in their own inner brokenness they cannot bear the diversity which makes demands on them from the outside. Their only answer to diversity is monotony, monotheism, monolithic political organisation. Thus the fascist of the 20th century is the evolved liberal of the 19th, for the "unity" of the liberal was and is a hollow ideal. And what has passed for monotheism in the West has in fact been polytheism, which breaks out from time to time in the form of pagan oppression, personal sadism or social fascism.

From time to time individuals and groups have sought to compress dissenters into conformity, through torture, ordeal, burnings at the stake, inquisitions, star chambers, character assassinations, and other methods of frantic monotheists. But, as Whyte says, "universality cannot be defended, for it can admit of no enemies and must transcend all divisions." (97,80). Not until a universal method of thought (such as unitary thought) tells us of a Universal Value which is public process and not private compensation, can we affirm a tolerance of diversity that will simultaneously unite and free individual men. For an ideal not only leads the personality holding it into an illusory security; it excludes others in their unique and diverse courses of development. But a universal formative process would allow for such uniqueness in development.

A third criticism of religion is the "dissociation" of Christianity.



This dissociation of the two major parts of man's nature was, given the historical conditions of the first and second millennia B.C., inevitable, but it continues because Christians are content with the illusory security afforded by the dissociation, wherein they can escape the uncertainty of process and the unrelenting lash of development.

According to Whyte, the most damning indictment of Christian dissociation is the relation between the Christian's compassion and sadism.

"Of all human capacities dissociated man regards compassion, or sympathy for the suffering of others, as his most precious. Compassion is the essence of Christianity, the mark of his noble failure. Dissociated man hates and pities himself; he also hates and pities others. . . . The Christian cross is a symbol not only of the compassion of Jesus, but of the sadism which he provoked." (220, 203).

For this reason, Whyte concludes, Christianity has not lessened war or hatred. Ultimately, the Antichrist of fascism was destined to appear on the scene in Europe; and his opportunity came when the 2000 year oscillation, precarious and anxious, moving back and forth between sensualist and monk, mystic and martyr, mass-man and individualist, finally reached a screaming tempo of rhythm which it could no longer endure or sustain, and which has already shattered in the explosions of world wars.

The description of this dissociation is enough to condemn it in the eyes of psychologists. Religious people, however, will not be convinced so readily. Their stumbling block in accepting this fact, says Whyte, is that as Christians they have, like Paul, resolved their inner conflicts by purging themselves of their conscious sinful desires and have thereby achieved a new partial integration. But this harmony, he explains, is secured by a process of suppression or dissociation, namely, the conviction that Jesus has lifted the burden of sin from them. Thus their instinctual desires are sublimated, and "Open conflict is converted into inner dissociation. This apparent victory over sin is the aim of union with the Messiah. As in all sadism the flesh of another crucified is our own flesh crucified, and the battle is won for us." (181, 164). The severities of a punitive conscience, ordinarily directed toward the self (as in the masochisms of the mediaeval monks) or toward others (as in the inquisitions and religious wars) may be sublimated likewise by re-directing them toward one who bears our griefs and carries our sorrows, who is wounded for our transgressions and bruised for our iniquities—and by whose stripes we are healed.

A fourth criticism of religion is its childishness. ("Childishness" is used in Freud's sense, not Jesus', for the latter conceived of children as endowed with that endogenous unity of personality which is of the Kingdom). Religion relies on a personal god, and monotheism expresses this reliance in the figure of a Heavenly

Father. For this reason monotheism is a premature articulation of man's quest for unity, since the idealistic notion of a Father as ultimate authority compensates for some unmet childhood need and reflects the immaturity of the race at the time of its origin. Yet it is a necessary idea, for "at that state the authority which man could most easily conceive was a father or person." (94, 66).

When the immature, childish man encounters failure, he imputes the failure to the indifference or indignation of a paternal god who has forsaken him in his hour of need. His own suppressed wrath, arising out of his frustration, is attributed to an invisible, celestial, father, the symbol of his real conscience acquired from a visible, terrestrial father. Thus his failures continue to be a mystery and his guilt continues to be appeased temporarily. But when the mature man encounters failure, he does not blame himself or others or God in a spasm of sadism or masochism; he seeks to understand the cause and, if blocked in the attempt to overcome it, he accepts it. If his method of unitary thought is obstructed at the practical level, it rises to conquer at the contemplative and aesthetic levels. But always his integrity goes with him; like the rod and the staff of the shepherd, it comforts him, and he does not need to lean on a supreme parent-figure to carry him through crises and to supervise his universe. He is his own father to the offspring of his tribulations, caressing here, criticising there, encouraging and warning, always accepting and urging toward integrity in the midst of tension and tragedy.

But for the child a father is required. For a child is beset by unbalance, and seeks integration. "The organising mental processes do not tolerate a vacuum. The formative processes always tend to establish symbols for organising behaviour. The most efficient of these are general ideas, but when ideas fail, the community returns to the personal symbol of the father, the magic man, the group leader, the hero. No one can escape this need." (153-4, 137). Thus it is not accidental that every one of the fascist countries had or has behind it a long tradition of authoritarian religion. "The Nazi is a symbol of a distortion universal to contemporary European and Western man. (150, 134). The will to power and the need to conform appear together, as twin signs of the despair of the individual in a society lacking any order which might permit him to develop his own life." (153, 137).

It is in their responses to tragedy that the difference between Christian and unitary man can be most clearly seen. The European Jew or Christian sought to overcome his incompleteness by the partial substitute of a flight into the infinite. Not only was God conceived to bear within Himself all the griefs and sorrows of men; He contained all the good. Hence Christian man could at one moment grovel before his wrathful, forgiving father, and at the next moment become identified with His goodness and thereby slay His wrath. This double-edged deed was accomplished at the sacrament of

communion, in which God is, in the last act, eaten and loved, and so simultaneously absorbed and destroyed.

But "unitary man is content to shape his finite life." (206). In so doing he takes death seriously, since it is the final limitation in a life realised only amid limitations. "To the unitary mind death is the chief symbol of the limitations without which life would lose its dignity." (223, 206). The only good which exists, exists in the definiteness of here and now. Since "definition is the soul of actuality," and since higher forms of integration can emerge only by and through the structure of process, unitary man accepts the conditions which are laid within him and around him and down upon him; he accepts his fate, whether it be development or death; and it is always both. Indeed, "integrated man by his mere existence challenges fate" (223, 206), for fate in the classical sense is some inner necessity which derails and dissolves and defeats the individual will, whereas unitary man dares to cope with the drift and dissolution of circumstance. "The hero is a man who has discovered that his finite life can only express the universal if he stakes it without reserve. . . . His integrity is resented by the divided . . ." (223, 206). Yet the unitary man will understand and accept the tragedy of this resentment, while the Christian, thinking he is following Jesus, will repudiate the finite world as wicked and perverse. The Christian, in short, cannot accept the tragedy of the natural, human, world because he is seeking a static integration which cannot by its nature be either in this world or of this world. The Christian is a lost child wandering a world bereft of fathers, a world which dares him to grow up or die; he is a child crying out for the security of a womb which is no more, and for a parent who has forsaken him.

A fifth criticism which Whyte makes of religion is that practically it has become the means whereby the privileged few achieved and maintained a tyranny over the under-privileged many. We might expect such a dissociation and tyranny in the social life when it is already pervasively present in the lives of individuals: when one part of the personality crowds out and cramps other parts in a shrewd internal adjustment. Moreover, as Whyte points out, "the idea of a personal God lacks any universal standard of validity, and surrender to such a god left the way open for religious and temporal interests to misuse divine authority for their own ends." (94, 77). Monotheism "was freely misused to protect the privileges of a few." (265, 249). Supernatural monotheism became an instrument for the suppression of dissidence in the social order, an instrument reinforcing the ascendancy of a select economic class. God was fashioned in the form of an "imperial ruler," an "Oriental despot," to use Whitehead's phrases. And, as Dewey has pointed out in *Reconstruction in Philosophy* (chap. iii), all of nature in classical philosophy and theology was interpreted in terms of hierarchical castes, mutually exclusive, fixed, tidily appointed, united by the exercise of claims from above and services from



below. Change, development, and transformation were thus construed as secondary, and revolt as the work of the devil. Religious knowledge was confined to a few, in the same way that economic privileges were conferred on the few. Monotheism meant monopoly in all walks of life. It spelled special privilege. But, for Whyte, the principle of development in nature is a "revolutionary principle" and "must challenge privilege." (218-9, 202).

It must challenge privilege because privilege is privacy from publicity, contrived artifice, static crystallisation out of flux, imposed division; and in nature there are no privacies, no eternal crystalline forms, no walls and no vacuums. For while nature is diverse, she is nonetheless one. Uniqueness, yes: it is a generic fact; but privilege and privacy consists in the insistence that *this* uniqueness is the *only* uniqueness, the *universal* uniqueness. He who gives a special favoured place to a part of his body or affect or mind in his personal life will in his social action somehow uphold special privilege. Theocratic or autocratic political structure will manifest the authoritarian personality. The mysterious charisma of the authority, who demands absolute obedience through fear, is the outward symbol and substitute of the inner, dark, tabued and indubitable voice of conscience. He must be separated and made special, for to face and understand him would mean to include and accept him and thereby transcend him through the only saving power in the world, creative transformation. "No man can look on God and live"; a man must die and be reborn if he dares behold the burning bush.

As a consequence of its favouritism toward a few, Christianity has proved futile in its efforts at basic social reform; it "has not lessened war, disease, or hatred." (221, 204). Hence a hypocritical gulf between its proclamations and its practices. And at the root of this hypocrisy lies a fundamental dishonesty, a denial of the deep dissociation that exists within each Christian—compassion and sadism, at the bottom of this dissociation lies an "awareness that development is threatened," a consequent fear of development, and a substitution of partial ideals which yield a temporary and precarious harmony. A by-product of this dissociation is pathological guilt; and the Christian's way of handling this guilt is repentance, which in Whyte's belief "normally covers a slipshod evasion of the necessity for the individual to understand himself." (222, 205). Moreover, the pattern of evasion is deepened as security is obtained from the deification of static ideals. "Conversion . . . changes a morbid state of conflict on which the attention of the individual is focussed, into a superficially harmonious condition which nevertheless conceals a dissociation so painful as to be permanently withdrawn from attention." (95, 78). Repentance, faith, and conversion relieve "that state of uneasy tension which is called the sense of guilt"; and "guilt in the monotheistic religions, though it was absent in primitive and ancient man, is evidence of a state of conflict between the spontaneous tendencies and the deliberate behaviour expected of

the individual in accordance with the prevalent social ideals." (94, 78).

The Christian's preoccupation with this internal conflict of *id* and *superego* has produced futility in the reform of society not only because it has led him into a self-centred concern with his own salvation, but also because the compensatory nature of the ideals—their "dark component" in instinctive man—has been denied and because therefore the ideals, being sundered from concrete fact, have lost their potency and have perpetuated the underlying and eventually intolerable tension. While the Christian found "balm in the service of others" (221, 204), the Christian system of monotheism led to the vicious sadism of Nazism, which simply uncovered what was hidden and released what fearful Christians dared not release but were forced to sanction because of their deep guilt over those same demonic impulses which were at work in them. The current sadism of American Christians can be measured in part by the extent to which they lead or support America's huge armament programme for the destruction of the Antichrist of Communism.

Yet Whyte is not without kind words for Christianity. It has been characterised by "superb aspiration." (221, 204). Monotheism was "an achievement beyond parallel"—for it was "an expression of the need to organise thought, to find order in fact and harmony in the self." It was "the first concept which was conceived as standing in a direct relation to everything." (92, 76). It "set human thought its standard and put scepticism to work" and was a symbol "of unlimited potentiality." (94, 77). It provided man with a framework of integration in which and by means of which he achieved great things in the realm of differentiation—quantitative science. Moreover, monotheism along with Platonism and democracy inspired "the principle that every individual has direct access to the dominant elements of the social tradition." (109, 93). This, according to Whyte, is the "permanent gift of Europe to mankind," the conviction that every individual could attain unto truth by immediate contact with God through sincere striving. (110, 93). But because the universals (such as God) have now disappeared the European tradition has also disappeared. What is required is a re-discovery of the Universal by empirical means—and this Universal is Whyte's Unitary process. This process it is claimed, escapes all the inadequacies inherent in Christian monotheism. But monotheism emerged when man needed it, at "the point of most rapid growth . . . so long as it aided the development of man, he remained loyal to it and benefitted from it . . . it was not only opium, it was bread and wine." (93, 77). Religion, like all of man's activities, is a mode of the unitary process.

*This article will be concluded in the next issue with a short critique of Whyte's views on the future of religion.—Ed.*

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*FRANCIS YOUNGHUSBAND: EXPLORER AND MYSTIC*  
by GEORGE SEAVER. John Murray, 1953, pp.391. 25/-. E. S. PRICE

With fine sympathetic insight Dr. Seaver, following his biography of Schweitzer, has drawn the portrait of another religious genius of our times, achieving in the act a just balance between the extravert and introvert motifs in a consummately integrated personality. We are grateful to Dr. Seaver for allowing Younghusband himself to speak, wherever possible, with autobiographical revelation. Here is a man whose public deeds were exemplary of the finest traditions of his race and whose most intimate experiences of mystical exaltation were communicated to his fellows with childlike enthusiasm and translated into action with the grace of a Master. The impression is unforgettable. Francis Younghusband was a 20th century saint! His legacy, the World Congress of Faiths, is ours to inherit. This book is one of the loveliest and most inspiring we have read for a long time. It drives one to read all that Younghusband ever wrote.

*LES PREMIERS CHRETIENS* by MARCEL SIMON. Presses Universitaires de France. Paris, 1952. pp.126. F. KENWORTHY

Professor Simon, Dean of the Faculty of Arts in the University of Strasburg, is known to many scholars on this side of the Channel, particularly by his *Verus Israel* (Paris, 1948). Readers of this Journal will remember his succinct article on the "Dead Sea Scrolls" (Summer, 1951). Members of the group of ministers meeting yearly at Great Hucklow in Derbyshire will also remember him personally as one of their most charming guest speakers and a clear interpreter of the French religious scene. For its popular educational purpose, his recent book could hardly be bettered. Within small compass he has produced an extremely readable and judicious account of the crucial years during which the movement inspired by Jesus of Nazareth broke away from the Judaism in which it was born to become eventually a universal faith. The story of those years can never wholly be told for, apart from two or three references by non-Christian writers, we must rely upon the New Testament writings. These, though religious documents of inestimable value, do not, from an historical point of view, give a complete picture. To elucidate the forces that gave rise to the Christian Church is a task of great complexity. In this vital but confused period, M. Simon moves with a confidence born of first-rate scholarship. With Professor S. G. F. Brandon, he sees the Fall of Jerusalem in 70 A.D., as decisive for the defeat of Jewish Christianity, which might otherwise have destroyed Paul's work, with incalculable consequences for the future. M. Simon writes with such clarity that even those with but a modest knowledge of French will profit greatly from his rational, independent and constructive treatment of this theme.



# One Hundred Good Books on Religion

Compiled by

PRINCIPAL RAYMOND V. HOLT, B.Litt., M.A.

THE BOOKS IN THIS LIST HAVE BEEN SELECTED TO HELP READERS TO UNDERSTAND THE PRESENT SITUATION AND TO PREPARE FOR THE COMING REVIVAL OF RELIGION

(Books marked with an asterisk are specially recommended)

“That religion will conquer which can render clear to popular understanding some eternal greatness incarnate in the passage of temporal fact.”—

A. N. WHITEHEAD

## 1. RELIGION AS EXPERIENCED IN LIVING RELIGIONS

### (a) EARLY CHRISTIANITY

ROWLEY, H. H.: *The Relevance of Apocalyptic: A Study of Jewish and Christian Apocalypses from Daniel to Revelation*. 1944. (Lutterworth)

MANSON, T. W.: *The Teaching of Jesus*. Studies of its Form and Content. 1945. (C.U.P.)

\*SCHWEITZER, A.: *The Mysticism of Paul the Apostle*. 1921. (Black)

\*RAWLINSON, A. E. J. (Editor): *Essays on the Trinity and Incarnation*. 1928. 1933 (Longmans). Particularly valuable are the articles by A. D. Nock on “Early Gentile Christianity and its Hellenistic Background,” and by F. H. Brabant, “God and Time.”

CADOUX, C. J.: *The Early Church and the World: A History of the Christian Attitude to Pagan Society and the State down to the Time of Constantius*, 1925. (Clark).

### (b) CHRISTIANITY AS A WHOLE.

NIEBUHR, R.: *Faith and History: A Comparison of Christian and Modern Views of History*. 1949. (Nisbet).

NYGREN, A.: *Agapé and Eros*. Revised ed. 1953 (S.P.C.K.).

D'ARCY, M. C.: *The Mind and Heart of Love: A Study in Eros and Agapé*. 1945.

\*FLEW, R. N.: *The Idea of Perfection*. 1934. (O.U.P.).

\*KIRK, K. E.: *The Vision of God*. (Bampton Lectures). 1931. (Longmans.)

OMAN, JOHN: *Grace and Personality*. 1917. Reprinted. (C.U.P.).

BRABANT, F. H.: *Time and Eternity in Christian Thought*. (Bampton Lectures). 1937. (Longmans).

CADOUX, C. J.: *Catholicism and Christianity*. 1928. (Allen).

TILLICH, P.: *The Protestant Era*. 1948. (Univ. of Chicago). 1951. (Nisbet)

PRATT, J. B.: *Can we keep the Faith?* 1941. (Yale U.P.).

### (c) NON-CHRISTIAN RELIGIONS:

BADLEY, J. H.: *Form and Spirit A Study in Religion*. 1951. (Routledge).

WACH, J.: *Types of Religious Experience: Christian and Non-Christian*. 1951. (Routledge).

\*ELIOT, C.: *Hinduism and Buddhism*. 3 vols. 1921. This is still by far the best book on the subject. It is out of print but can be obtained from a number of libraries.

RAWSON, J. N.: *The Katha Upanishad*. 1934. (Calcutta Association Press & O.U.P.).

- \*HEIMANN, B.: *Indian and Western Philosophy: A Study in Contrasts*. 1937. (Allen).  
 PRATT, J. B.: *The Pilgrimage of Buddhism*. 1928. (Macmillan).  
 \*RHYS DAVIDS (MRS.): *A Manual of Buddhism for Advanced Students*. 1932. (Sheldon).  
 CARPENTER, J. E.: *Buddhism and Christianity: A Contrast and a Parallel*. 1923. (Hodder).  
 OTTO, R.: *India's Religion of Grace and Christianity Compared and Contrasted*. Translated 1930. (S.C.M.).  
 \*HOCKING, W. E.: *Living Religions and World Faith*. (Hibbert Lectures). 1940. (Allen).  
 CHANG, WING-TSIT: *Religious Trends in Modern China*. 1953. (Columbia).  
 GIBB, H. A. R.: *Modern Trends in Islam*. 1947. (Chicago).

## 2. RELIGION IN THE EXPERIENCE OF INDIVIDUALS.

### (a) MYSTICISM:

- \*JONES, R. M. and W. C. BRAITHWAITE have written a seven volume History of Quakerism, most of which are now out of print. R. M. Jones wrote a preface to each of these volumes. These prefaces contain the wisest and most profound account of mysticism in concrete experience that I know. The titles of the first two volumes are as follows: *Studies in Mystical Religion*. 1909 Reprinted; and *Spiritual Reformers in the 16th and 17th Centuries*. 1914. (Macmillan).  
 OTTO, R.: *Mysticism, East and West; a Comparative Analysis of the Nature of Mysticism*. Translated 1932. (Macmillan).  
 BUBER, M.: *Two Types of Faith*. 1951. (Routledge).  
 FAUSSET, H. I.: *Towards Fidelity*. 1952. (Gollancz).

### (b) PRAYER AND WORSHIP:

- HEILER, F.: *Prayer*. 1932, 1938. (O.U.P.).  
 UNDERHILL, E.: *Worship*. 1936. Reprinted. (Nisbet).

### (c) PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE:

The study of psychology is advancing so rapidly and so many provisional and partial hypotheses are accepted by their exponents as complete explanations and made into dogmas, that the ordinary reader is in great need of a critical and annotated bibliography. Some very pungent criticisms of the limitations of the different schools and their tendency to substitute phrases ("semantic tricks") for experience are given by the Physician for Psychological Medicine at St. Bartholomew's Hospital—Dr. E. B. Strauss in his *Reason and Unreason in Psychological Medicine*. 1953. (H. K. Lewis).

For an introduction to the subject, Dr. R. W. Wilde recommends the following books:

- THOULESS, R. H.: *An Introduction to the Psychology of Religion*. 2nd ed. 1924. (O.U.P.).  
 GRENSTED, L. W.: *The Psychology of Religion*. 1952. (O.U.P.).  
 JAMES, W.: *Varieties of Religious Experience*. Revised ed. 1902. (Longmans).  
 PRATT, J. B.: *The Religious Consciousness*. 1924. (Macmillan).  
 ALLPORT, G. W.: *The Individual and His Religion*. 1951. (Constable).  
 JUNG, C. G.: *Psychology and Religion*. 1938. (Yale U.P.).



## (d) SPIRITUAL HEALING:

WEATHERHEAD, L. D.: *Philosophy, Religion and Healing*. Second ed. 1952. (Hodder),

## 3. RELIGION AND HUMAN HISTORY.

- \*COLLINGWOOD, R. G.: *The Idea of History*. 1946. (Clarendon Press).  
 OAKLEY, H. D.: *History and the Self*. 1934. (Williams and Norgate).  
 BUTTERFIELD, H.: *History and Human Relations*. 1951. (Collins).  
 GINSBERG, M.: *The Idea of Progress*. 1953. (Methuen).

## 4. RELIGION AND THE WORLD OF NATURE.

- \*HOCKING, W. E.: *Science and the Idea of God*. 1944. (University of North Carolina Press).  
 \*HEARD, GERALD: *Is God Evident? An Essay towards a Natural Theology*. 1950. (Faber).  
 RUSSELL, E. S.: *The Directiveness of Organic Activities*. 1946. (C.U.P.).  
 HUXLEY, J.: *Evolution in Action*. 1953. (Chatto).  
 \*WHITEHEAD, A. N.: *Science and the Modern World*. 1928. (C.U.P.).  
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 JOAD, C. E. M.: *Philosophical Aspects of Modern Science*. 1932. Reprinted. (Allen).

## 5. THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE.

- DE BURGH, W. G.: *From Morality to Religion*. (Gifford Lectures). 1938. (Macdonald & Evans).  
 WATERHOUSE, E. S.: *The Philosophical Approach to Religion*. 1923. Reprinted. (Epworth).  
 WATERHOUSE, E. S.: *The Philosophy of Religious Experience*. 1933. Reprinted. (Epworth).  
 HAWKINS, D. J. B.: *The Essentials of Theism*. 1949. (Sheed & Ward).  
 TURNER, J. E.: *The Nature of Deity*. 1927. (Allen).  
 PRINGLE-PATTISON, A. S.: *The Idea of God*. (Gifford Lectures). 1920. (O.U.P.).  
 \*HOCKING, W. E.: *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*. 1912. (Yale U.P.).  
 BAILLIE, J.: *Our Knowledge of God*. 1939. (O.U.P.).  
 \*WEBB, C. C. J.: *God and Personality*. (Gifford Lectures, First Course). 1920. (Allen).  
 WEBB, C. C. J.: *Divine Personality and Human Life*. (Gifford Lectures, Second Course). 1920. (Allen).  
 BRAHAM, E. G.: *Ourselves and Reality*. 1929. (Epworth).  
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 \*CASSIRER, E.: *An Essay on Man*. 1944. Reprinted. (Yale U.P.).  
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- \*TAYLOR, A. E.: *The Faith of a Moralist*. (Gifford Lectures). 2 vols. 1931. (Macmillan).  
 STREETER, B. H.: *Reality, a New Correlation between Religion and Science*. 1927. (Macmillan).  
 VON HUGEL, F.: *The Reality of God and Religion and Agnosticism*. 1931. (Dent).  
 \*MACKENZIE, J. S.: *Ultimate Values*. 1924. (Hodder).  
 WARD, J.: *The Realm of Ends. Pluralism and Theism*. (Gifford Lectures). 1912.  
 LAIRD, J.: *The Idea of the Soul*. 1924. (Rider).

## 6. PHILOSOPHY.

Contemporary English Philosophers have little of value to say on religion. They are mostly concerned with the examination of the meaning of words and language and of mathematical symbols. No doubt in time the results of these investigations will enrich the study of philosophy. But "experience must precede the attempt to understand it."

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(The underlying moral, mental, spiritual and social conflicts of the present day inevitably find expression in the art and literature of the times. The writer does not feel qualified to prepare a bibliography of art and literature and hopes that some competent person will undertake the task).